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5Chapter 1: Background
Introduction
Federal financing for ocean and coastal conservation is a 
landscape composed of dozens of government agencies, 
grant programs with differing objectives, and declining 
funding. All too often, funds are piecemeal and provided for 
a short duration, making it a challenge to achieve large 
conservation visions and results at a meaningful scale. 
In 2010, The Nature Conservancy launched a project 
investigating new and sustainable federal funding 
mechanisms to support marine conservation, restoration, 
and planning in the United States. The Conservancy began 
its process with a thorough literature search and developed 
an inventory of funding options. The advantages and 
disadvantages of each funding source were analyzed and 
criteria developed to narrow the revenue sources to those 
that may best contribute to conservation outcomes. 
Throughout the project, expert opinion was solicited and 
roundtables were held to gather feedback. This white paper 
presents the research and assessment results.
Revenue sources examined in this report include: 
•	 Fines	derived	from	illegal	activities;
•	 Mitigation;
•	 Market-based	approaches;
•	 Taxes	and	user	fees	within	the	energy,	fisheries,	and	
shipping	sectors;
•	 Public-private	
partnership 
agreements;	and
•	 Modifications	to	
existing funding 
streams to direct  
funds to ocean and 
coastal efforts.
The revenue sources 
presented in this 
document are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. Within each category, 
various financing tools and approaches are available and 
can often be combined to achieve the funding goal. It 
should be noted that this white paper is not intended to 
provide an exhaustive analysis of all potential sources of 
funding that can be used to support conservation, 
restoration,	and	planning	efforts;	rather	the	intent	is	to	
identify federal funding sources that show promise for 
future investments in our oceans and coasts.
The Federal Funding Landscape
For years, there has been chronic underinvestment in 
marine conservation funding. Underfunding and shrinking 
budgets at the federal, regional, state, and local levels have 
For the purposes of this 
document, the terms 
“marine” and “oceans 
and coasts” are used 
interchangeably. This 
project seeks to address 
the funding needs of the 
broader ocean and 
coastal ecosystem.
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6left	critical	habitats	unmapped	and	unprotected;	reduced	
monitoring	and	scientific	investments;	hampered	
restoration	efforts;	and	impeded	new,	effective	national	
policy initiatives such as fishery reforms, regional ocean 
governance, marine spatial planning, large-scale coastal 
conservation, and ecosystem-based management. This 
situation persists despite longstanding and widespread 
recognition of the problem.
Environmental issues typically receive less attention during 
economic downturns (Gallup, 2009), though environmental 
and economic benefits often overlap. The recession and 
high unemployment rates have made job creation a top 
priority for the nation. Furthermore, the soaring federal 
budget deficit has made it clear that federal spending must 
be stabilized or reduced. Despite the present political 
climate and current economic conditions, we must not 
ignore the environment upon which many livelihoods, 
economies, and recreational activities rely. As seen 
firsthand with the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of 
Mexico, the fouling of ocean and coastal ecosystems can 
have severe and rippling environmental, economic, and 
social impacts.
Two bipartisan commissions, the Pew Oceans Commission 
(2003) and the presidentially appointed U.S. Commission 
on Ocean Policy (2004), document many important 
changes needed to protect and restore ocean health while 
allowing ocean resources to continue to provide robust 
contributions to the national economy. Recommendations 
from their reports include increasing coordination in 
federal waters, promoting ocean education, conserving and 
restoring coastal habitat, reducing marine pollution, among 
many others. The Commission on Ocean Policy estimates 
that new funding of $1.3 billion the first year and $2.4 
billion the second year is needed to implement their 
recommendations. While seemingly expensive, this is a 
small investment when compared to the following annual 
figures for ocean-related economic activity: $700 billion in 
shipped goods, $50 billion from fishing and trade, $11 
billion from cruise ships, and $25 billion to $40 billion from 
offshore oil and gas production. In addition, more than $1 
trillion is generated each year within communities 
immediately adjacent to the coast (U.S. Commission on 
Ocean Policy, 2004).
In recent history, efforts to secure new funding for ocean 
conservation have largely been unsuccessful. In 2000, the 
Conservation and Reinvestment Act (CARA), which would 
have guaranteed $3.1 billion annually for 15 years to 
federal, state, and local conservation programs, failed to be 
enacted (Congressional Record, 2000). Its funding would 
have come from a portion of the income derived from 
federal offshore oil and natural gas leases. CARA was 
considered by many to be the most important conservation 
funding legislation in half a century, leading to broad 
bipartisan support within Congress and across the nation. 
More than five thousand conservation, civic, religious, and 
business organizations supported CARA, including the 
National Association of Counties, the U.S. Conference of 
Mayors, and the National Governors Association (Pew 
Oceans Commission, 2003). Of the $3.1 billion, the 
following would have been dedicated specifically to ocean 
and coastal efforts annually:
•	 $430	million	for	coastal	states	for	impact	assistance	
(Department	of	the	Interior);
•	 $350	million	for	coastal	states	for	ocean	and	coastal	
conservation	(Department	of	Commerce);
•	 $25	million	for	coral	reef	protection	(Department	of	the	
Interior	and	Department	of	Commerce);	and
•	 $900	million	for	a	fully	funded	Land	and	Water	
Conservation Fund (Department of the Interior and 
Department of Commerce) (Zinn and Corn, 2001).
Since CARA, the idea of capturing oil and gas revenues for 
conservation has persisted, with numerous bills introduced 
each year. Some of these bills have led to the successful 
enactment of legislation benefiting oil- and gas-producing 
states. One example is the Coastal Impact Assistance 
Program	(CIAP)	within	the	Energy	Policy	Act	of	2005;	it	
authorizes oil and gas revenues to be distributed to outer 
continental shelf oil and gas producing states for the 
conservation, protection, and preservation of coastal areas. 
Under the program, the Secretary of the Interior is 
authorized to distribute $250 million to producing states for 
each of the fiscal years 2007 through 2010 (Bureau of 
Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement 
[BOEMRE], 2010a). In accordance with the allocated funds, 
BOEMRE awarded grant funds from FY2007 through 
FY2011. Beginning in FY2012, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service will award remaining grant funds, estimated at 
$500 million. CIAP grant management and monitoring 
functions have extended beyond the original disbursement 
period. It is projected the installments will continue to fund 
grants management and oversight through FY2018.
More recently, in 2010 and again in 2011, legislation to 
establish a new National Endowment of the Oceans (NEO) 
has been introduced. NEO’s funding would be derived from 
four sources: interest on Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund 
investments, outer continental shelf lease revenue, fines 
collected for violations of federal law, and split recovery 
from punitive damages (Senate of the United States, 
2011a). Despite support from numerous sectors, NEO’s 
enactment is uncertain. 
At the same time that new resources are proving 
challenging to secure, existing funding levels are 
7decreasing. Monies for key federal agencies with 
responsibilities for the management and conservation of 
the oceans, coasts, and Great Lakes are set to decrease in 
Fiscal Year 2013, and budget examiners project additional 
reductions in the future. 
Project Purpose and Scope
The Conservancy launched a research project in 2010 to 
identify a range of federal funding options, both legislative 
and administrative. The Conservancy set out to identify and 
investigate a suite of traditional, innovative, and/or new 
financing ideas that if implemented could help fund marine 
conservation, restoration, and planning work, paying 
particular attention to funding ideas to help implement 
federal initiatives such as marine spatial planning.
By examining these options, the Conservancy hopes to 
spark dialogue about conservation finance and contribute 
ideas that can help address funding gaps for key national 
ocean and coastal conservation goals. This white paper 
may also serve as an initial step in the formation of a 
coalition of organizations interested in advocating for new 
funding for the ocean.
Methodology
The field of conservation finance is constantly evolving as 
new ideas are conceived and tested. To hone existing ideas, 
while allowing new ideas to emerge, the following four-
step methodology was utilized for this project:
Research Financing Strategies
The Conservancy obtained information on existing and 
innovative financing strategies through literature reviews, 
research on existing funding structures, and interviews 
with experts in the field of conservation finance. Building 
on the Conservancy’s substantial experience in creating 
sustainable financing for conservation around the globe, 
relevant sustainable finance models from other countries 
were also reviewed.
Determine Evaluation Criteria and Analyze Ideas
The Conservancy established evaluation criteria to assess 
the opportunities and limitations of each idea discovered 
during the research. The criteria also allowed for 
comparison of different funding mechanisms and revenue 
sources to identify the most viable options for further 
exploration and possible implementation. The criteria are as 
follows and detailed in Table 1:
Table 1. Quantitative and Qualitative Key for Assessing the Viability of Funding Ideas
Financial High =  Potential annual 
revenue is >$200 million
Moderate =  Potential 
annual revenue is 
between $50 and $200 
million
Low =  Potential annual revenue 
is  <$50 million
Legal High = Few legal 
hurdles
Moderate = Some legal 
hurdles
Low = Many legal hurdles
Political High = Few political 
obstacles to adoption
Moderate = Some 
political obstacles to 
adoption
Low = Many political obstacles 
to adoption
Social High = Little social 
opposition
Moderate = Some 
social opposition
Low =  Much social opposition
Environmental* Positive = Positive 
environmental impacts
Neutral = Neither 
positive nor negative 
environmental impacts 
(or cancel out)
Negative = Negative 
environmental impacts
Timeframe Short = 1-3 years Moderate = 4-7 years Long = 8+ years
* “Environmental impacts” refers to the effects of the revenue source itself on the environment, not the effects of the activities of the 
industry upon which the revenue source is based.
8•	 Financial - To understand which funding mechanisms 
and revenue sources may generate the most revenue, 
factors include: potential base revenue, administrative 
and maintenance costs, and the degree of fluctuation in 
the revenue stream from year to year for public-sector 
and rate-payer funds. And for market-based 
opportunities, the amount of private capital that can be 
invested, and the expected revenue.
•	 Legal - It is important to determine the potential legal 
obstacles. For example, can the mechanism or revenue 
source be established within the current legal 
framework, or would new legislation or executive action 
be required?
•	 Political - When establishing a public funding 
mechanism or a revenue stream that requires legislative 
or executive action, factors include: existing and potential 
political will, capacity and advocacy abilities of interested 
organizations, political obstacles, and potential 
champions.  
•	 Social - The success of a funding mechanism or a 
revenue source is inextricably linked to having a wide 
base of support from individuals and stakeholders. To 
determine the potential support and enthusiasm for a 
mechanism or revenue source, the equity and social 
impacts of implementing the mechanism or source must 
be taken into account.
•	 Environmental - The ultimate goal of the funding 
mechanism is to fund conservation efforts. Therefore, the 
environmental impacts, both positive and negative, of 
implementing a new mechanism or revenue stream must 
be assessed. 
•	 Timeframe – Considerations include the amount of time 
needed to establish the funding mechanism and the time 
needed for the mechanism to either secure a dedicated 
revenue source or begin generating revenue.
Solicit Feedback
In 2011, the Conservancy hosted three Funding Option 
Roundtables to further develop and vet the initial research 
results. These roundtables encouraged experts from 
various backgrounds to share successful financing 
examples from their respective sectors and allowed the 
Conservancy to gather and ground-truth information. In 
addition to the roundtables, the Conservancy conducted 
over a dozen individual interviews with leading sector 
experts. Information and opinions obtained through these 
efforts have been incorporated into this white paper.
Develop a White Paper
The Conservancy summarized the results of the study in 
this white paper to guide decision-making on strategies to 
increase investments in the conservation of our oceans  
and coasts. 
© Hunter Nichols 
9Chapter 2: Funding 
Mechanism and Revenue 
Source Analysis
The most promising federal funding ideas that emerged 
from the project are discussed in this section. The two sets 
of tools – funding mechanisms and revenue sources – must 
go	hand-in-hand;	any	mechanism	must	be	paired	with	a	
robust and predictable revenue source. These options can 
be selected in various combinations to provide the ideal 
funding solution for the issue at hand. 
Some ideas presented, in particular market-based 
approaches, can act as both mechanisms and revenue 
sources. They are mechanisms in that there is a system to 
mobilize or transfer funds. However, they are also potential 
revenue sources since there is an investment or fee 
component to stimulate the system. For the purposes of 
this document, those market-based ideas are categorized 
as “revenue sources”.
The following section provides brief descriptions of the four 
funding mechanisms and nineteen revenue sources 
analyzed for the project. The funding mechanisms are 
explained in greater detail in Appendix A: In-Depth Look at 
Funding Mechanisms, while the revenue sources are 
explored further in Appendix B: In-Depth Look at  
Revenue Sources. 
Funding Mechanisms
•  Trust Fund
Federal trust funds are accounting mechanisms used to 
link receipts with the expenditures of those receipts, 
usually dedicated for a specific purpose (More information 
on Page 18). 
•  Revolving Loan Fund
A Revolving Loan Fund consists of a pool of federal funds 
that recycles money as loans are repaid (Page 19).
•	 Payment for Performance
A payment-for-performance fund is an outcome-based 
contract between private investors and the federal 
government to generate cost savings while improving 
conservation outcomes (Page 20).
For the purposes of this document, a funding 
mechanism is designed to transfer funds to 
cover costs related to implementing ocean 
and coastal conservation, restoration, and 
planning works.
A revenue source is designed to generate 
funds that flow through the funding 
mechanism to the appropriate works  
or projects.
© Douglas Steakley 
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•  National Conservation Bond
A national conservation bond would resemble the 
traditional general obligation (GO) bonds secured by a 
government’s vow to use available resources, including tax 
revenues, to repay bond holders (Page 22).
 
Revenue Sources
• Tax on Imported Maritime Commerce
An ad valorem tax levied on a percentage of the value of 
cargo imported to the United States (Page 24).
• Cruise Ship Environmental Fees
A cruise ship environmental fee per capita for cruise ship 
passengers at each port of call (Page 25).
• Fees for Preferred Shipping Routes
A premium for preferred commercial shipping routes that 
emulates tolled roads for faster and more predictable 
navigation (Page 26).
• Fees for Aquaculture in Federal Waters
Opening and leasing federal waters to aquaculture and 
generating revenue through lease sales, permits, or other 
fees (Page 27).
• Seafood Excise Tax
An excise tax collected by a producer, wholesaler, or 
retailer on all seafood products sold in the United States 
(Page 28).
• Fishing Stamp
A stamp geared towards anglers that emulates the national 
Duck Stamp program (Page 29).
• Offshore Oil and Gas Revenues
Dedicating revenues from any number of monetary 
transactions (leases, rents, and royalties) in the offshore oil 
and gas industry (Page 30).
• Offshore Renewable Energy Revenues
Dedicating revenues from monetary transactions in the 
offshore renewable energy industry (Page 32).
• Increased Tax on Crude Oil
A tax levied on each barrel of crude oil produced or 
imported into the United States (Page 33).  
• Increased Federal Excise Tax at the Pump
An increase in the existing federal excise tax on gasoline, 
with a percentage of the added revenue dedicated to 
marine conservation (Page 34).
• Tax on Shipping Bunker Fuel
A minimal tax on bunker fuels, the high-viscosity fuel used 
to propel large cruise ships, container ships, and tankers 
(Page 35)
• Oil Rig Liability Fund
Receipt of a portion of an oil company’s savings from 
converting oil installations to reefs, instead of bringing the 
structures to shore for salvage (Page 36).
• Fines
Dedicating fines collected for illegal ocean activities to 
marine conservation (Page 37)
• Mitigation
A compensatory mitigation program applied to seagrasses, 
coral and oyster reefs and other marine or coastal 
environments (Page 38). 
The Social Impact Bond was implemented as a method 
to reduce reoffending by individuals serving short-term 
prison sentences at Peterborough Prison in England. At 
the time of implementation, 60 percent of the prisoners 
reoffended, costing the government money. The theory 
was that if recidivism dropped, it would result in 
significant cost savings for the government.
Private investors pooled $8 million to fund a local NGO, 
which offered services such as mentoring and drug 
counseling. Their goal was to reduce recidivism by ten 
percent, and if the target was met, investors would get a 
7.5 to 13.4 percent return on their investment. The funds 
would come from government cost savings resulting 
from improved social service performance (Jupp, 2011). 
The Great Barrier Reef Foundation funds research that 
protects and preserves the Great Barrier Reef, 
particularly in the face of climate change. The 
Foundation, in alliance with industry partners, has 
teamed with investment groups to develop a revenue 
stream that is based on direct and indirect users of the 
Reef. This model, in part, would allow the federal 
government to charge commercial vessels that travel 
through the Reef. Between 7,500 and 10,000 vessels 
travel through the Reef annually; to circumvent it adds 
two days of travel time. The proposed charge for 
passing through the Reef is AU$1,000 (Hanratty, 2012).
Case Study – Payment for Performance: 
United Kingdom’s Social Impact Bond
Case Study – Fees for Preferred Shipping 
Routes: Australia’s Great Barrier Reef
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• Payment for Ecosystem Services
A market-based approach to assigning economic value to 
the services natural resources provide, where payments are 
made for natural resource performance (Page 39).  
• Nutrient Trading
An environmental market that involves a voluntary 
exchange between a buyer and a seller of a unit of nutrient 
reduction (Page 41).
• Blue Carbon
Protecting mangrove, seagrass, and salt marsh habitats by 
assigning credits to their stored carbon and selling them 
on the carbon market (Page 42)
• National Partnership Agreements
Public-private partnerships to leverage funds for marine 
conservation (Page 43).
Forever Costa Rica is a nonprofit association developed 
by the Costa Rican government and its associates – The 
Nature Conservancy, the Linden Trust, the Moore 
Foundation, and the Walton Family Foundation. The aim 
of the partnership is to develop a sustainable funding 
source for protected-area expansion and management. 
The partners have a fundraising goal of $50 million. The 
funds will be invested and the earnings will be used to 
finance the project’s recurring costs (Forever Costa 
Rica, 2011).
Case Study – National Partnership 
Agreements: Forever Costa Rica Partnership 
for Protected Areas
• Targeted Government Efficiencies
Streamlining and reconfiguring existing government 
programs to reduce programmatic costs and maximize 
existing federal dollars to increase positive conservation 
outcomes (Page 45).
During the brainstorming phase of the project, numerous 
innovative ideas from state, local, and international sources 
were also unearthed. Although not applicable to the federal 
scope of this project, a list of these other ideas may prove 
informative and can be found in Appendix C.
Assessment of Funding Ideas
The following charts display the funding mechanisms and 
revenue sources discussed in this white paper, based on 
their feasibility and the estimated timeframe to adopt the 
strategies. Each idea presented was run through the 
criteria and is depicted below in terms of high, medium, 
and low viability. Please note: the terminology for the 
The New York City model illustrates the cost-saving potential of implementing Payment for Ecosystem Services to fund 
watershed management, rather than incorporating traditional water-related filtration infrastructure. In order to comply with 
safe drinking water standards, the City of New York began looking for methods to improve water filtration deriving from 
three watershed sources, the Crofton, Catskills, and Delaware watersheds. The estimated cost to construct a new filtration 
plant to meet the City’s drinking water needs exceeded $7 billion, with operating costs above $300 million (NYCDEP, 2010).
The high cost of implementing a filtration system led the City to look into watershed management as a method to reach 
the same drinking water quality outcomes. The program was developed to pay local landowners to establish and maintain 
Best Management Practices that would protect water quality and avoid the need to construct a new filtration plant. Paying 
for the maintenance of watershed services is much less expensive (less than $2 billion), maintains water quality more 
effectively, and produces additional benefits to the region (NYCDEP, 2010).
Case Study - Payment for Ecosystem Services: The New York City Watershed Program
Table 2. Viability vs. Timeframe of 
Funding Mechanisms
Viability* Timeframe
Funding Mechanisms
Trust Fund High** Medium
Revolving Loan 
Fund
High** Medium
National 
Conservation 
Bond
High** Long
Payment for 
Performance
High** Long
*Viability: The overall feasibility of implementing the funding 
mechanism where High = Few obstacles to adoption; Moderate 
= Some obstacles to adoption; Low = Many obstacles to 
adoption
** Presumes a revenue source has been secured to seed and 
support the funding mechanism.
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Table 3. Viability of Revenue Sources
Revenue Sources
Evaluation Criteria
Financial Legal Political Social Environmental Timeframe
Marine 
Industries
Tax on Imported 
Maritime 
Commerce
High Moderate Low Moderate Neutral Medium
Cruise Ship 
Environmental Fees
Moderate Variable Low Moderate Neutral Medium
Fees for Preferred 
Shipping Routes
Variable Moderate Moderate Moderate Neutral Long
Fisheries 
and 
Aquaculture
Fees for 
Aquaculture in 
Federal Waters
Low Moderate Moderate Moderate Neutral Long
Seafood Excise Tax High Moderate Low Moderate Neutral Medium
Fishing Stamp Low Moderate Moderate Moderate Neutral Long
Energy
Offshore Oil and 
Gas Revenues
High Moderate Low Moderate Neutral* Long
Negative*
Offshore Renewable 
Energy Revenues
Moderate Low Low Moderate Neutral Long
Increased Tax on 
Crude Oil
Moderate Moderate Low Moderate Neutral Medium
Increased Federal 
Excise Tax at the 
Pump
High Moderate Low Low Neutral Long
Tax on Shipping 
Bunker Fuel
High Low Moderate Moderate Neutral Medium
Oil Rig Liability 
Fund
Variable Moderate Moderate Moderate Positive Medium
Fines Variable Moderate Low High Neutral Short
Mitigation Variable Moderate Moderate High Neutral Long
Market-
Based
Payment for 
Ecosystem Services
Variable Moderate High Moderate Positive Long
Nutrient Trading Variable Moderate Moderate Moderate Positive Variable
Blue Carbon Variable Moderate Low Moderate Positive Long
National Partnership Agreements Variable High High High Variable Short
Targeted Government Efficiencies Variable High High High Positive Short
*The environmental impacts from offshore oil and gas may fall into either the “neutral” or “negative” categories. Their assignment will 
depend on the conditions placed on implementing a funding mechanism. See page 30 for more information.
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rankings vary, however, overall, green indicates a higher 
viability ranking, yellow indicates a moderate viability 
ranking, and red indicates a lower viability ranking. Refer to 
Table 1 to review the terminology key for the charts.
Funding Mechanism Analysis Results
As shown in Table 2, the funding mechanisms reported in 
this document demonstrate a high level of viability if a 
revenue source can be identified and secured. The funding 
mechanisms are very different in nature and structure, and 
represent both traditional and innovative models of federal 
conservation funding. The most suitable mechanism will 
largely depend on the challenges addressed, the economic 
circumstance, and the political and regulatory environment.
Trust funds and revolving loan funds are traditional 
mechanisms frequently utilized for federal conservation 
financing. For these mechanisms to become truly viable, 
first and foremost, a revenue stream must be identified, 
secured, and set in motion. The structure of the 
mechanisms is not controversial in itself. However, when 
proposed in Congress, oftentimes the associated revenue 
streams create divisiveness, and as a result, resolution and 
establishment of the funds seldom occur.
As an alternative to traditional mechanisms, two innovative 
concepts – national conservation bonds and payment-for-
performance systems – provide unconventional, yet promising 
approaches to marine conservation finance. These concepts 
are fueled by fees or government cost savings, respectively. 
The timeline to implement any of these mechanisms is 
expected to be long, in part due to regulatory and 
legislative hurdles. Emerging projects, both domestic and 
international, continue to demonstrate positive outcomes, 
garnering increasing support for these concepts.
Revenue Source Analysis Results
The revenue sources found herein range from revenues 
derived from government efficiencies, pooling of resources 
through partnerships, charges to large commercial 
industries, market-based user fees, and taxation. 
The most feasible revenue sources within a short timeframe 
are the development of targeted government efficiencies 
and the establishment of national partnership agreements. 
Targeted governmental efficiencies (as explained in 
Appendix B), with their premise of better management of 
existing dollars to produce greater conservation outcomes, 
are a very attractive option regardless of the economic 
situation, though this option is particularly palatable during 
hard times. Of particular interest is the potential 
reallocation of Natural Resource Damage Assessment 
(NRDA) settlement funds to areas of greatest conservation 
outcomes for the impacted natural resource. In many 
cases, the adjustments needed for cost savings are 
permitted under existing regulations and statutes. 
Partnerships are good investment mechanisms for 
governments, foundations, and private entities to leverage 
funds from additional sources. They are a powerful tool to 
garner support from potential new audiences and mobilize 
resources and personnel with little to no legislative or 
executive hurdles. 
Mitigation and market-based approaches, although on a 
longer timeframe, represent emerging models that show 
significant promise for revenue generation and cost-
savings when compared to traditional environmental 
solutions. There is building momentum from pilot projects 
and fully-operational mitigation and market-based projects 
that demonstrate the benefits of private funding and 
© Damian Gadal/Flickr
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innovative methods to addressing a conservation problem 
in a federal framework.
Revenue sources derived from shipping, ports, fisheries, 
and energy industries remain possible opportunities. The 
key to accessing these sectors lies in working with industry 
early in the mechanism development process and 
incorporating the sectors’ needs into a mechanism. 
Lessons can be learned from earlier efforts such as the 
proposed CARA legislation of 2000. During the CARA 
effort, there was strong and regular communication among 
pro-CARA coalition members 
and strong engagement by 
large businesses, industries, 
and interest groups to 
legitimize and move forward 
the endeavor. 
A thorough description and 
feasibility analysis for the 
funding mechanism and 
revenue sources is provided 
in Appendices A and B.
Observations
As part of the project, the 
Conservancy held roundtable 
sessions and meetings with 
leading sector experts to 
collect and validate 
information gathered on 
marine conservation finance options. Throughout these 
sessions and meetings, it became clear that looking solely 
at federal funding ideas may not be the optimum approach 
for increasing investments in our oceans and coasts. While 
The Need for Unity and Action
The search for marine funding opportunities 
has been a recurring endeavor (Rubin and 
Alderson, 1988; Spergel and Moye, 2004). 
The challenges with implementing funding 
strategies do not stem from a lack of ideas; 
rather, the marine community and partners 
must coalesce around an idea in order to 
create the momentum to push marine financing 
forward. 
The marine community represents diverse 
niches, making it difficult to center around one 
common effort. The next step in funding marine 
efforts involves addressing the human 
component – setting aside differences to unify 
and take action to incite change.
the conservation community is not giving up on the 
possibility of identifying funding at the federal level, the 
economic and political situation may lead the focus to shift 
towards identifying funding for states, counties, and 
localities. The more local the project, the more support it 
tends to garner, particularly bipartisan support. However, 
even among coastal communities, support is contextual 
and depends on whether funding is perceived as “new” 
money or will compete with funds for other economic and 
community purposes.
The obstacles and limitations 
associated with 
implementing a marine 
conservation funding 
mechanism do not stem 
exclusively from external 
forces. The marine 
conservation community 
needs to broaden its own 
view to include innovative 
solutions to address 
longstanding conservation 
funding needs. Historically, 
the community has not been 
committed to working with 
non-traditional partners, a 
step identified in this study 
as essential for achieving 
success. Similarly, the 
community needs to expand 
its array of strategies for 
addressing conservation funding issues, from engaging 
with agencies in order to create better efficiencies to 
pushing for innovative funding mechanisms instead of 
relying upon traditional mechanisms and approaches.
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Chapter 3: Conclusions
The most promising ideas tend to be those that exhibit a 
direct nexus to the ocean and coastal environment, present 
little political or industry opposition, and can be 
implemented in a relatively short timeframe. As such,  
the following funding mechanisms and revenue sources 
show the greatest potential for action on the short or 
medium term.
•	 Trust funds and revolving loan funds are well known 
funding mechanisms frequently used to disburse funds 
for conservation purposes. They can be implemented in a 
relatively short timeframe, pending the identification of a 
suitable revenue source to propel the fund. 
•	 Targeted government efficiencies are feasible in great 
part due to the potential cost reductions and maximization 
of federal dollars by streamlining or altering existing 
federal programs. Targeted government efficiencies do 
not necessarily require “new” money or necessitate 
Congressional approval, allowing for faster implementation. 
•	 National partnership agreements present 
opportunities to team with non-traditional groups and 
organizations and leverage existing conservation dollars. 
Few obstacles limit the possibilities of public-private 
partnerships;	they	are	still	a	largely	untapped	market.	
Encouraging further public-private partnerships could 
lead to major innovation in the ocean and coastal 
environment.
In the longer term, the marine community should work 
together to incubate and promote innovative ideas that may 
flourish as they become increasingly proven and 
mainstream. The following funding mechanisms and 
revenue sources show great potential as a long term 
investment of time and energy. 
•	 Payment-for-performance models encourage private 
investments and offer an efficient way to achieve 
environmental results. 
•	 National conservation bonds would enable investors 
to both profit financially and help preserve ocean and 
coastal resources. The nature of these bonds precludes 
fund uses for other purposes, which helps to increase 
the bond holders’ confidence and directs money to its 
intended target.
•	 Payment for ecosystem services, if designed and 
implemented well, offer great potential for protecting 
marine ecosystems. Putting a value on a good helps 
provide an incentive for people to produce it, and in the 
case of ecosystem services, conserve it. Payment for 
ecosystem services offers a means of appropriately 
valuing ecosystems in an innovative and flexible way, and 
it presents policymakers another tool to deliver policy.
The obstacles to accessing revenue from shipping, ports, 
fisheries, and energy industries are not insurmountable. 
However, significant coalition building with conservation 
groups and industry alike needs to occur in order to 
develop a funding mechanism that incorporates the needs 
of all stakeholders. 
Now that several potential sustainable mechanisms and 
revenue sources that show promise on a federal scale have 
been identified, the following ideas can be used to 
establish a process to foster implementation:
© Rebecca Wells
16
(1) Identify the full range of ecological problems the 
mechanism would address and the root cause of those 
problems.
(2) Establish how to best solve the problems that are 
urgent ecological and public concerns, develop 
potential solutions, and determine their costs over the 
short and long terms.
(3) Match the needs of the potential solution with the 
appropriate funding mechanism and revenue 
source(s). Establish a clear connection between the 
revenue generated and how it will be used.
(4) In the case of the introduction of an innovative funding 
mechanism, implement pilot studies that have the 
potential to be scaled up.
(5) Conduct outreach and education to stakeholders, the 
public, federal agency staff, and members of 
Congress, form a coalition of advocates to shepherd 
the idea through the necessary steps, and build a 
campaign strategy to persuade and encourage 
support for the idea.
(6) If legislative action is required, engage select elected 
officials to assure their support. A fundamental aspect 
to any sustainable funding mechanism is that it will 
take political will to institutionalize many of the 
mechanisms identified.
(7) Getting a mechanism in place does not mean that the 
funding to conservation automatically happens, as 
evident in numerous examples over the last thirty 
years including the Land and Water Conservation Fund 
and the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund. With these 
funds, monies are not fully appropriated to 
conservation and dredging, respectively, and are 
instead deposited into the Treasury to offset the deficit. 
A long term and sustained coalition is needed to 
ensure that Congress and the Administration follow 
through and funding continues to go towards its 
intended purposes.
Final Remarks
The marine environment can’t wait for the perfect funding 
mechanism and revenue source to fall into place. Instead, 
the conservation community must create the needed 
coalitions and cultivate action. The ideas in this white paper 
represent a starting point for more in-depth discussions 
and analyses. Two good places to start could be 
demonstrating the possibilities of targeted government 
efficiencies and market-based opportunities such as 
payment for ecosystem services. 
Establishing sustainable conservation financing for our 
oceans and coasts is critical to balancing environmental 
needs with human uses. Conserving these ecosystems 
through adequate funding ensures that they maintain the 
ability to sustain people and nature now and into the 
future.
Appendix A: 
In-Depth Look at  
Funding Mechanisms
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Appendix A: In-Depth Look 
at Funding Mechanisms
Trust Funds
Federal trust funds are accounting mechanisms used to 
link receipts with the expenditures of those receipts, 
usually dedicated for a specific purpose. The federal 
government has custody of the funds as well as the 
earnings of most federal trust funds. Three types of trust 
funds are common: 
•	 Endowment funds, in which revenues are drawn from 
fund income only, while simultaneously trying to 
maintain	or	increase	capital;	
•	 Sinking funds, from which all assets are liquidated over 
a	given	period	of	time;	and	
•	 Revolving funds, designed to receive regular 
replenishment from various sources (Flores et al., 2008).
Trust funds can be established as public funds, private 
funds, or a combination of the two. In total, the United 
States federal budget has more than two hundred public 
trust funds. Among the largest trust funds are Social 
Security and Medicare.
Some states have public/private hybrid trust funds, like the 
Wyoming Wildlife and Natural Resource Trust (State of 
Wyoming,	2011).	It	is	funded	by	legislative	appropriations;	
private individuals and corporations may also make 
contributions to the trust fund. 
With adequate capitalization and effective management, 
trust funds are viewed as desirable mechanisms for 
financing conservation because they are, by definition, a 
sustainable structure. Trust funds are a favorite and 
reoccurring	idea	with	the	ocean	conservation	community;	
however, problems with trust funds arise from a lack of 
political will (e.g., CARA and NEO), disinterest amongst 
agencies to manage the account, and difficulty in 
accessing funds from the Treasury. 
The designation of a fund as a “trust fund” does not 
establish how the spending of a fund is managed. 
Although the federal budget distinguishes between general 
federal funds and trust funds, this designation does not 
guarantee that money will go towards it its intended 
purpose. Instead, the budget is divided into “discretionary” 
and “mandatory” categories, and those determine how a 
fund is controlled: mandatory funds are automatically 
allocated and discretionary funds require annual 
appropriations.
Oftentimes, trust funds may earn interest on balances. The 
extent to which funds may earn interest and the rate at 
which interest is earned are determined by Congressional 
authorization. Most of the trust funds are invested in 
special, nonmarketable Treasury securities. In some cases, 
laws may permit that the interest earned by one fund’s 
investment be used for a different purpose (GAO, 2001).
A constant concern with trust funds is the inappropriate 
diversion of funds for purposes other than what was 
intended. Since the cash from trust funds is commingled 
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with other receipts in the Treasury, it is often used to pay 
other federal expenses. Surpluses from trust funds are 
frequently lent to the general fund of the Treasury, and the 
trust funds, in many cases, are given special 
nonmarketable Treasury securities in return. These act as 
IOUs that can be redeemed in the future. However, if 
surpluses are inadequate to redeem the securities, the 
government then needs to borrow more from the public, 
raise	taxes,	reduce	spending,	or	a	combination	thereof;	
otherwise, the funds cannot be redeemed and those 
dedicated funds are, in effect, unavailable for the purposes 
for which they were created (GAO, 2001).
The Dingell-Johnson Sport Fish Restoration Program is 
a cooperative effort between federal and state agencies, 
anglers, boaters, and the sport fishing industry. The 
Program is one of the nation’s most effective “user-pay, 
user-benefit” programs. The Program was established in 
1950 by the Dingell-Johnson Act, which implemented 
an excise tax on certain fishing equipment to fund sport 
fishing projects throughout the United States. Later 
amendments to the Dingell-Johnson Act, from Senators 
Wallop and Breaux, expanded the range of items that 
fall under the excise tax to include motorboat fuel, 
imported watercraft, and added fishing tackle items; 
increased the program’s funding; and established the 
Aquatic Resources Trust Fund (Virginia Department of 
Game & Inland Fisheries, 2011). 
An excise tax of 10 percent applies to the sale price of 
fishing rods, poles, reels, and their components; tackle; 
and other fishing supplies. There is a 3 percent tax on 
the sale price of electric outboard boat motors. An 
additional tax is imposed on motorboat fuel and small 
engine fuel. The monies generated are deposited in the 
Treasury and allocated to states for sport fishery 
restoration, habitat conservation, boat safety, and 
boating access and facilities projects (USFWS, 2011c). 
The Dingell-Johnson Sport Fish Restoration Program’s 
actual budget in 2009 was $497 million, with $402 
million in payments to states (USFWS, 2011b). 
Case Study – Federal Trust Fund: Dingell-
Johnson Sport Fish Restoration Program and 
Wallop-Breaux Reauthorizations
The establishment of a federal-level trust fund dedicated to 
ocean and coastal conservation is a challenging feat. 
Attempts to create an ocean and coastal trust fund have 
failed for over twenty years, in great part because of 
divisiveness in identifying and securing a sustainable 
revenue source. 
The following are important elements to increase the 
feasibility of adopting a federal-level marine conservation 
trust fund, as determined during roundtable sessions and 
expert meetings:
1. Engage a diverse group of partners, including industry, 
trade groups, the fisheries sector, and other interests, 
to build support and provide greater political clout 
than efforts pushed only by environmental groups. 
Overt backing from commercial sectors and other 
non-environmental interest groups is vital to 
overcoming political challenges and thus the 
successful enactment of such legislation. The group of 
partners would ideally come together in the initial 
phase, and together would develop a common goal 
and create a mutually agreed upon approach to 
achieving that goal. Having the group that pays for the 
program involved and supportive is critical to gaining 
public and political support. The Dingell-Johnson 
Sport Fish Restoration Program is a good example of a 
“user pay, user benefit” model.
2. Make a clear connection between the revenue source 
used to support the trust fund and how that money 
will be used (e.g., taxes on sport fishing equipment to 
support restoration of sport fish). 
3. Select a suite of potential revenue sources to generate 
income for a trust fund, if possible. Diversifying the 
revenue sources means the burden to generate 
monies for the fund does not lie on a single sector or 
industry. Additionally, this creates stability in the fund 
if revenue from one source decreases.
4. Develop an advocacy plan that articulates the  
problem well and identifies specific actions to 
generate solutions.
5. If legally possible, embed safeguards in the legislation 
language to ensure regular, full funding of the  
trust fund.
The appropriate choice of revenue source will greatly 
depend on the targeted goal. For example, a revenue 
source suitable for fisheries research would differ from a 
revenue source suitable for coastal adaptation. See Table 3 
to identify revenue sources based on their feasibility and 
timeframe for implementation.
Federal Revolving Loan Funds
A revolving loan fund consists of a pool of federal funds 
that recycles money as loans are repaid. Loan recipients 
are typically states, local governments, communities, and 
nonprofit organizations, and loan repayments are recycled 
back into the program to fund additional projects.
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Existing revolving loan programs, such as the Clean Water 
State Revolving Fund (see case study above), allow states  
a certain level of flexibility and innovation with the 
disbursement of their funds. Each state sets its own loan 
terms, interest rates, and repayment methods. States may 
target their funds to provide assistance to the communities 
or the water quality priorities of greatest need.
Interest rates for federal revolving fund loans average 2.2 
percent, lower than market rates (EPA, 2011). While below 
market interest rates are designed to give borrowers a 
financial advantage, there are some pitfalls. Revolving loan 
funds	are	typically	neither	growing	nor	self-sustainable;	
most loan programs require periodic injections of new 
federal funds. Additionally, inflation can steepen the 
decline of a loan program’s capital base, leaving few funds 
to cover operating costs (GAO, 2006).
The following are important elements to increase the 
feasibility of adopting, and successfully running, a  
federal-level marine conservation revolving loan fund,  
as determined during roundtable sessions and  
expert meetings:
1. Key to a successful revolving loan program is pairing a 
loan program with a marine or coastal industry or 
other revenue source to infuse the loan fund with 
initial seed funding. Although the principle of a 
revolving loan fund is one where repayments to the 
loan are recycled, a steady infusion of money is 
essential, especially in the initial phase when loan 
repayments are not yet feeding the fund. This revenue 
source should be sustainable and steady.
2. There needs to be a mechanism by which the state, 
municipality, or nonprofit organization is able to repay 
the loans. This can be achieved through a user or 
access	fee;	a	state,	local,	or	special	tax;	a	surcharge	to	
utilities	or	other	service;	or	other	traditional	or	
innovative financing structure.
3. Leverage additional funds whenever possible by 
partnering with other funding sources, such as  
banks, nonprofit groups, local governments, and  
state agencies.
Similar to the trust fund model, the appropriate choice of 
revenue source for a marine conservation revolving loan 
fund will greatly depend on the targeted goal. Please see 
Table 3 to identify potential revenue sources based on their 
feasibility and timeframe for implementation.
 
Payment for Performance
An environmental payment-for-performance fund is a form 
of outcomes-based contract in which the public sector 
commits to pay for significant improvement in 
environmental outcomes. The use of this mechanism for 
environmental issues is modeled upon Social Impact Bonds 
used in the United Kingdom. Social Impact Bonds are not 
bonds in the conventional sense. While they operate over a 
fixed period of time, they do not offer a fixed rate of return. 
Repayment to investors is contingent upon specific social 
outcomes being achieved.
Through Social Impact Bonds, private investment is used to 
pay for interventions for repeat offenders who are doing 
short-term prison sentences. The interventions are 
delivered by service providers with a proven track record in 
rehabilitation, drug treatment, and other social services. 
Financial returns to the initial investors are made by the 
public sector on the basis of improved social outcomes 
(payment for performance). If outcomes do not improve, 
then investors do not recover their investment. 
Social Impact Bonds provide upfront funding for prevention 
and early intervention services, and remove the risk that 
interventions do not deliver adequate outcomes from the 
public sector. The public sector pays if, and only if, the 
intervention is successful. 
The Clean Water State Revolving Fund (CWSRF) has gained widespread recognition as a program that provides low-
interest financing to fund a wide variety of water quality infrastructure projects. Funds may be used for nonpoint-source 
pollution management, watershed protection and restoration, estuary management projects, and traditional municipal 
wastewater treatment projects.
The CWSRF is an independent and permanent source of low-cost financing. Funds for the CWSRF programs are provided 
through federal government grants and state matching funds (20 percent of federal). As the loans are repaid, money 
becomes available to be used again for new financing – a true revolving fund. The total funds available to the program to 
date have been over $74 billion, providing over 24,688 low-interest loans nationwide (EPA, 2011). 
Case Study – Federal Revolving Loan: Clean Water State Revolving Fund
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A diagram of the flow of money and services can be seen 
in Figure 1. The figure shows an example of the Social 
Impact Bond model applied to environmental restoration. 
Following a contract agreement between the public and 
private sectors, a service provider (a nonprofit organization, 
community group, or company specializing in 
environmental restoration), is paid by the investors to 
provide the on-the-ground restoration activities and 
achieve the targeted outcome (e.g., restoring x acres of 
habitat). If the performance measure is reached, a portion 
of the governmental cost savings achieved through the 
contracting of the service is paid out to the investors, as 
determined in the initial public-private agreement.
This payment-for-performance model is well suited to 
environmental issues, and is an innovative way of attracting 
new investment around outcomes-based contracts that 
benefit taxpayers and the environment alike. An 
environmental payment-for-performance setup could 
attract private investment in service providers (nonprofit 
organizations, private companies, entrepreneurs, and 
community groups) to try out solutions to environmental 
problems. If the solution meets the predetermined metrics 
defined for the problem, the federal government would pay 
those who invested in the solution a share of the cost 
savings. In this case, the federal government would not 
spend anything until it gets the results determined in the 
contract. And “results” means cost savings as well as 
meeting environmental outcomes. The risk is placed on the 
investors, not the federal government, if the outcomes are 
not met (Jupp, 2011). However, this particular model does 
imply ongoing public funding for the program in question. 
The benefit is in the savings difference between what the 
program would have cost through direct government 
service versus what it costs through pay-for-performance 
contracting. Either way, the contract depends on ongoing 
appropriated public funding, and is thus very subject to the 
vagaries of budget ups and downs.
The following diagram shows a proposed payment-for-
performance structure involving restoration activities.
Figure 1. Restoration-based Environmental Payment-for-Performance Structure 
(Diagram adapted from Jupp, 2011)
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The payment-for-performance environmental model may 
be best suited for projects where results are quantifiable, 
such as acreage of habitat restoration or volume of 
emission or nutrient reduction, among others.
An important step in establishing an environmental 
payment-for-performance model is developing a feasibility 
study to ensure better outcomes and value. Items to 
identify include the targeted environmental outcome, the 
existing gap in service, the potential federal government 
savings, potential investor interest, and contract 
deliverables and timeline (Jupp, 2011).
A willing pool of investors must be identified. This new 
group of investors is motivated by environmental as well as 
financial returns, and has a strong sense that the private 
sector can bring efficiencies to tackling existing 
environmental problems. Environmental investors can be 
private individuals or come from entities or nonprofit 
grant-making organizations, as they often have prior 
experience with funding projects that address an ecological 
problem. These groups may also bring significant expertise 
to the project and can directly engage with the organization 
delivering the environmental service.
While this potentially offers an efficient way to achieve 
environmental results, it still assumes public funding 
(provided to private environmental entrepreneurs for 
performance). Thus, it still confronts upfront challenges 
regarding the public appetite for spending toward the 
purpose in question.
 
National Conservation Bond Initiative
Unlike a payment-for-performance bond model, a national 
conservation bond would resemble the traditional general 
obligation (GO) bonds issued by states and municipalities. 
A GO bond is secured by a government’s pledge to use 
legally available resources, including tax revenues, to repay 
bond holders. 
A similar structure to the Australia Coral Reef Bond could 
be adopted in the United States. The issuance of a national 
conservation bond would require authorization from 
Congress. It would also require a taxation or fee structure 
designed to pay out the bond at maturity. Suitable revenue 
source pairings could include: fees for preferred shipping 
routes, port-based fees, or charges assessed on the 
fisheries and energy sectors.
This national conservation bond would function like almost 
any other government bond. Bond holders would receive 
interest regularly over a period of years and then be paid in 
full upon bond maturity. Bond interest rates are set by the 
market and become fixed when they are first purchased.
A national conservation bond would enable investors to 
both profit and help to preserve ocean and coastal 
resources;	this	combination	is	likely	to	be	attractive	to	
investors looking to “green” their investment portfolio. The 
nature of these bonds precludes fund uses for other 
purposes, which helps to increase the bond holders’ 
confidence. 
 
A major nationally-focused marine conservation bond 
initiative now under way in Australia promises to direct 
much-needed funding to adaptation and mitigation 
research along the Great Barrier Reef. Spearheaded by 
the Great Barrier Reef Foundation, Australia’s Coral 
Reef Bond involves strategic engagement with the 
private sector.
In August 2009, the Foundation contracted with Oxford 
Economics to conduct a study to define the economic 
value of the Reef. Their assessment of the Reef’s value 
to the Australian economy was an astounding AU$51 
billion. Furthermore, their study indicated that if there 
were to be a catastrophic bleaching event, the value of 
the Reef would decrease by 73 percent nationally; and 
in certain tourism-heavy localities, decrease by as much 
as 90 percent.
In light of these findings, the Foundation teamed with 
Goldman Sachs and KPMG to develop a revenue 
stream to support Reef research. The proposed bond 
model calls for the federal government to collect a small 
surcharge from Reef tourism users and vessels that go 
through the Reef.
The fees collected through this federal structure would 
be channeled solely to the Foundation. It was identified 
early on in the mechanism development phase that to 
ensure the participation of industry and commercial 
interests, the monies would ultimately need to end up at 
the Foundation for management. 
The bond is guaranteed by the Australian Finance and 
Investment Corporation, a government-owned body. 
Goldman Sachs’ role is to raise the bond and managing 
the bond investments. This initiative is a five-year bond 
expected to generate AU$50 million. Additionally, 
partners (scientific organizations, engineers, outreach 
groups, etc.) have agreed to match every dollar received 
with an equivalent in-kind contribution (Hanratty, 2012).
Case Study – A National Conservation Bond 
Initiative: Australia’s Great Barrier Reef
Appendix B: 
In-Depth Look at  
Revenue Sources
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Appendix B: In-Depth Look at 
Revenue Sources
Tax on Imported Maritime Commerce
Viability
Financial High
Legal Moderate
Political Low
Social Moderate
Environmental Neutral
Timeframe Medium
Ad valorem taxes are currently assessed on imported 
maritime commerce, with funds directed to the Harbor 
Maintenance Trust Fund (see case study at right). An ad 
valorem tax is a type of tax which is levied on property 
according to its value. A new or increased ad valorem tax, 
even at a very low percentage rate of the value of cargo 
imported to the United States, could generate a very large 
and stable revenue stream.  
The Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund revenues are 
generated through the Harbor Maintenance Tax to 
recover harbor operation and maintenance costs, in 
particular dredging. The tax is levied on shippers using 
United States ports. The tax is assessed at a rate of 
0.125 percent of cargo value ($1.25 per $1,000 in cargo 
value) (Marlowe &Company, 2011). 
On paper, the fund has a surplus $5.65 billion (RAMP, 
2008). However, those funds are not fully appropriated 
to dredging and are instead deposited into the Treasury 
to offset the deficit.
Case Study – Tax on Imported Maritime 
Commerce: Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund
Determination of Feasibility
Advantages Disadvantages
•		With	a	large	volume	of	cargo	imports,	even	a	small	
value-based fee could generate large income.
•		The	public	generally	accepts	fee	structures	where	the	
user pays.
•		There	are	no	added	environmental	impacts	with	this	
revenue source.
•		With	an	existing	framework	to	collect	a	tax	on	the	
percentage of cargo value, there may be fewer legal 
obstacles than from a new mechanism.
•		The	shipping	industry	has	a	strong	lobby,	and	there	
may be significant political resistance depending upon 
the idea and its benefits.
© Marc Del Santro 
25
Cruise Ship Environmental Fees
Viability
Financial Moderate
Legal Variable
Political Low
Social Moderate
Environmental Neutral
Timeframe Medium
A number of Caribbean countries have asserted their right to impose regulations and fees on the cruise industry. In 1996, 
six Caribbean countries (Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent) jointly decided to charge a $1.50 
per passenger “cruise ship waste disposal fee” to finance environmental cleanup and conservation (The Nature 
Conservancy, 2004). St. Lucia alone receives approximately seven hundred thousand cruise ship visitors per year 
(Caribbean Business Journal, 2011). Implementing the surcharge quickly adds up to over $1 million annually for 
conservation activities in St. Lucia.
Case Study – Cruise Ship Environmental Fees: Caribbean Cruise Industry Fees for Waste Disposal
Determination of Feasibility
Advantages Disadvantages
•	 With	a	large	number	of	cruise	ship	tourists,	a	small	fee	
could generate significant revenue.
•	 The	public	generally	accepts	fee	structures	where	the	
user pays.
•	 There	are	no	added	environmental	impacts	with	this	
revenue source.
•	 The	implementation	of	a	cruise	ship	fee	could	be	
applied at the federal, state, or local level.  Therefore, it 
is difficult to determine legislative obstacles that may 
be faced.
•	 The	cruise	ship	industry	has	a	strong	lobby,	and	there	
may be resistance.  
•	 Many	of	the	largest	cruise	line	companies	are	
registered in countries outside of the United States in 
order to avoid regulations.
The cruise industry is a sector of tourism with a rapid rate 
of growth combined with the tendency to concentrate 
near ecologically dynamic coastal environments. 
Environmental fees on tourism deserve attention within 
tourism policy, due to the dual function of environmental 
protection and revenue generation they can provide. 
One way to put into action a cruise ship environmental fee 
is through the implementation of an arrival fee per capita 
for cruise ship passengers at each port of call. 
Implementing a new natural resources fee can be used to 
offset ship-related impacts at ports and harbors, as seen 
in the following case study.
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Fees for Preferred Shipping Routes
Viability
Financial Variable
Legal Moderate
Political Moderate
Social Moderate
Environmental Neutral
Timeframe Long
Shipping vessel companies rely on favorable climates, 
smooth seas, and efficient routes to effectively and 
prosperously deliver goods across the globe. Of all the 
variables that go into shipping profit margins, the latter is 
the only one under human control. Taking a shorter, more 
direct route to access port can oftentimes cut days in the 
delivery schedule, resulting in significant cost savings.
Implementing a premium for preferred commercial 
shipping routes could bring satisfaction to the shipping 
industry and open up an entirely new and innovative 
source of revenue for marine conservation.
The preferred shipping route concept could emulate High 
Occupancy Toll (HOT) lanes. HOT lanes are tolled lanes 
that operate alongside existing highway lanes to provide 
users with a faster, more predictable travel option.
Ground transportation HOT lanes require single-occupant 
vehicles to pay a toll that varies based on demand, called 
congestion pricing. The tolls change throughout the day 
according to real-time traffic conditions in order to  
manage the number of cars in the lanes to keep them  
less congested.
A marine shipping HOT lane could either emulate this 
variable toll rate, based on demand, or it could be a straight 
set fee as is the case in Australia’s Great Barrier Reef 
(AU$1,000 fee for a vessel to cross the Reef, rather than 
circumvent it).
Determination of Feasibility
Advantages Disadvantages
•	 A	shipping	lane	surcharge	of	minimal	cost	could	
generate large revenue, though the national annual 
revenue would greatly depend on the number of  
HOT shipping lanes adopted and the fee applied to 
access them.
•	 Efficiency	in	shipping	is	beneficial	to	the	industry	and	
the economy.
•	 Shorter	routes	could	mean	reduced	emissions.
•	 Industry	support	for	the	fee		would	be	contingent	 
on whether new routes for faster shipping would  
be available.
•	 May	face	little	political	opposition,	especially	if	the	
industry is supportive.
•	 May	be	viewed	as	a	win-win	by	the	shipping	industry	
and conservation alike.
•	 Creating	shipping	lanes	in	or	near	protected	areas	
increases risk of impacts to those areas and resources.
•	 Implementation	may	be	on	a	long-term	timeframe;	as	
route studies, fee structures, outreach to the shipping 
industry, and establishment of the system would all 
take some time.
•	 A	charge	for	the	use	of	existing	routes	would	not	be	
viewed favorably by the shipping industry.
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Fees for Aquaculture in Federal Waters
Viability
Financial Low
Legal Moderate
Political Moderate
Social Moderate
Environmental Neutral
Timeframe Long
Currently the United States imports 84 percent of its fish 
(NOAA, 2008). To increase domestic production, NOAA and 
the Department of Commerce recently issued new policies 
intended to open up federal waters to fish and shellfish 
farms. Currently, most United States marine fish and 
shellfish farms are located in state waters, and none exist 
in federal waters. The opening and leasing of federal 
waters would present new opportunities to develop 
sustainable revenue sources through lease sales, permits, 
or other fees. Another option could emulate the oil and gas 
industry’s Oil Spill Liability Tax on crude oil and impose a 
per-unit fee on aquaculture production.
Determination of Feasibility
Advantages Disadvantages
•	 The	introduction	of	aquaculture	to	federal	waters	is	an	
emerging	industry;	therefore	the	potential	exists	to	
shape the revenue structure early.
•	 Creates	job	growth	in	the	United	States	economy.
•	 Shifts	the	seafood	trade	imbalance.
•	 Aquaculture	is	a	marginally	profitable	industry,	and	the	
demand to expand to federal waters is not substantial. 
Some question whether such fees could amount to 
significant revenue, especially given the potential risks 
and the impacts on wild fisheries in some cases.
•	 The	technology	to	enable	profitable	production	in	
federal waters has not yet been established.
•	 Support	for	the	implementation	of	an	aquaculture-
based revenue source can be misconstrued as 
encouragement of increased aquaculture development.
•	 Environmental	impacts	from	aquaculture	expansion	
into federal waters can be significantly higher than 
what the revenue will be able to mitigate. 
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Seafood Excise Tax
Viability
Financial High
Legal Moderate
Political Low
Social Moderate
Environmental Neutral
Timeframe Medium
An excise tax in the United States is an indirect tax on 
listed items. Excise taxes are collected by a producer, 
wholesaler, or retailer, and are often hidden within the 
price of a product rather than being itemized, as is the case 
with a state or local tax.
Americans consume 4.9 billion pounds of fish and shellfish 
per year (NOAA, 2011b). With the implementation of an 
excise tax either at the wholesale or retail level, a 
significant funding stream can be generated without the 
need to implement a high fee.  
To minimize tax accounting complications, excise taxes are 
usually imposed on quantities like gallons of fuel, gallons of 
wine or drinking alcohol, packets of cigarettes, etc., and are 
typically paid initially by the manufacturer or retailer. All 
excise taxes are, of course, passed on to the consumer.
As an example, if an excise tax were implemented on fish 
and shellfish on a per-pound basis, at a mere $0.05 per 
pound, $245 million per year would be generated. At $0.10 
per pound, $490 million would be generated.
The federal passenger air transportation excise tax 
(commonly referred to as “ticket tax”) is imposed on 
the amount paid for commercial air transportation. 
When a person purchases a ticket for air transportation, 
the airline collects the federal passenger air 
transportation excise taxes from the purchaser and later 
pays the collected amount over to the IRS. The tax 
includes:
•	 A	7.5	percent	tax	on	the	base	ticket	price;	
•	 A	domestic	segment	tax	of	$3.70	per	person	per	
segment (a single takeoff and single landing); 
•	 An	international	travel	facilities	tax	of	$16.30	per	
person for flights that begin or end in the continental 
United States, or $8.20 per person for a flight that 
begins or ends in Alaska or Hawaii; and 
•	 A	6.25	percent	tax	on	the	amount	paid	for	
transporting property (cargo) by air.
The money captured from these charges, along with a 
federal excise tax on aviation fuels, is directed to the 
Airport and Airway Trust Fund. This trust fund is used to 
support the activities of the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA). At the beginning of fiscal year 
2011, the trust fund had a cash balance of $9.4 billion 
(FAA, 2011). This fund, in effect, suffers from the same 
challenges as many other trust funds where funds are 
collected (and credited to the Treasury) but are not fully 
allocated to the purposes for which the taxes were 
intended.
Case Study – Federal Excise Tax:  
Air Transportation
Determination of Feasibility
Advantages Disadvantages
•	 The	revenue	generation	potential	of	a	federal	excise	tax	
on fisheries is significant.
•	 The	cost	is	spread	out	over	a	broad	base	of	consumers.
•	 Once	the	mechanism	is	established,	the	generation	of	
revenue is almost instant, as the purchase of fish and 
shellfish products occurs on a daily basis.
•	 It	may	be	viewed	positively,	as	the	consumers	buying	
fish are contributing to the preservation of the resource 
they are using (“user pays”).
•	 Environmentally,	this	revenue	source	is	anticipated	to	
be neutral.
•	 It	would	require	the	excise	tax	to	be	incorporated	into	
the federal tax code.
•	 It	may	be	construed	as	a	deterrent	to	consumers	
choosing a healthy protein source, especially among 
lower income groups.
•	 Increased	prices	may	deter	consumers	from	choosing	
certified-sustainable products, which are typically 
already at a higher price point. However, certified-
sustainable products could have a lower tax than 
non-certified products to overcome this challenge.
•	 In	general,	elected	officials	shy	away	from	the	
implementation of taxes.
•	 An	excise	tax	that	has	a	fixed	amount	(e.g.,	$0.05	per	
pound) does not keep up with inflation or the changing 
value of the commodity.
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Fishing Stamp
Viability
Financial Low
Legal Moderate
Political Moderate
Social Moderate
Environmental Neutral
Timeframe Long
Hunting and fishing stamps can be developed to support 
conservation efforts. One idea is to create a fishing stamp 
that emulates the “Duck Stamp” produced by the U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service.
The Duck Stamp is not a postage stamp, but rather a 
migratory waterfowl hunting license. At $15 apiece, the 
stamp also allows the purchaser to enter National Wildlife 
Refuges at no additional cost. The stamp is furthermore a 
collectable stamp, very popular amongst conservationists 
and stamp collectors. The Duck Stamp generates over $25 
million dollars annually (USFWS, 2011a).
Determination of Feasibility
Advantages Disadvantages
•	 There	may	be	little	political	opposition	to	a	 
Fishing Stamp.
•	 Good	model	of	“user	pays”.
•	 Unlike	waterfowl	hunting,	marine	recreational	fishing	
participation continues to be high and is increasing  
in select regions. Catch and harvest recreationally is 
increasing and overtaking commercial catch for a 
number of species. 
•	 There	are	examples	of	viable	fishing	stamps	(e.g.,	
freshwater trout/salmon stamp) in several states.
•	 The	revenue	from	the	Duck	Stamp	is	comparatively	
low.
•	 Anglers	who	already	pay	for	fishing	licenses	may	
oppose an added fee.
•	 The	timeframe	to	adopt	such	a	stamp	is	over	the	 
long term.
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Offshore Oil and Gas Revenues
Viability
Financial High
Legal Moderate
Political Low
Social Moderate
Environmental Neutral Negative
Timeframe Long
Offshore oil and gas revenues present a significant 
potential source of conservation funding. Currently, 
numerous coastal and marine groups, forums, and leaders 
are focusing on offshore oil and gas revenues as a primary 
source of substantial future conservation funding. Although 
previous attempts to target offshore oil and gas for revenue 
generation have failed, the large revenue generation 
potential, coupled with the strong nexus to offshore 
environmental impacts, continue to make it an attractive 
option for further exploration.
Funding for conservation efforts could be established at 
several points within offshore oil and gas monetary 
transactions:
•	 Offshore	lease	sales,	with	a	competitive	“bonus	bid”	paid	
by	the	bidding	company;
•	 “Rent”	or	a	right-of-way	fees	per	acre	of	space	occupied	
by	the	installation;
•	 Royalties	based	on	a	percentage	of	the	value	of	what	is	
extracted (typically ranging from 12.5 percent to 18 
percent,	depending	on	the	location	and	depth);	and
•	 Annual	rental	fees	of	$15	per	mile	of	pipeline.
Typically, offshore royalty and rent fees increase with the 
depth of water, strengthening the nexus between increased 
revenue and increased hazards to marine environment.
It is estimated that offshore oil and gas generate $5 billion 
in revenue annually in royalties alone (U.S. House of 
Representatives, 2011). 
The Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF) was 
created in 1965 to “safeguard natural areas, water 
resources and our cultural heritage, and to provide 
recreation opportunities to all Americans.” LWCF is 
geared towards the development and preservation of 
national parks, as well as national wildlife refuges, 
national forests, rivers and lakes, community parks, and 
trails in all fifty states (LWCF Coalition, 2011).
LWCF uses revenues from offshore oil and gas to 
support land and water conservation. Nine-hundred 
million dollars in royalties paid by oil and gas companies 
drilling on the outer continental shelf (OCS) are put into 
the fund annually (Vincent, 2006). The aim of LWCF is to 
have a dedicated fund for the purpose of creating and 
conserving national parks, wildlife refuges, and other 
important natural areas, and to provide matching grants 
for state and local parks and recreation projects. 
However, much of the funding for LWCF is retained in 
the Federal Treasury, and only a fraction of its original 
amount is dedicated to land and water conservation.  
For example, the enacted funding for FY2008 was $155 
million, FY2009 $180 million, and FY2010 $306 million 
– each year falling short of the $900 million originally 
approved by Congress (LWFC Coalition, 2011).
Case Study – Oil and Gas Revenue for 
Conservation: The Land and Water 
Conservation Fund
© Marvin Scott/ketchikanphotos.com 
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Determination of Feasibility
Advantages Disadvantages
•	 The	offshore	oil	and	gas	industry	is	an	established	and	
certain revenue source.
•	 Record-breaking	profits	are	an	indication	that	a	large	
sum of revenue is generated from this industry.
•	 No	steep	decline	in	demand	is	expected	in	the	 
near future.
•	 Models	of	existing	revenue	source	structures,	such	as	
LWCF, can be emulated to provide a framework for  
the fund.
•	 Once	the	fund	is	established,	revenue	is	generated	
quickly, as it is an established industry with existing 
strong revenues.
•	 This	mechanism	would	not	create	any	additional	
environmental impacts over those already incurred by 
the	industry;	the	exception	would	occur	if	the	fund	
were established based on an agreement to expand 
access to the outer continental shelf (see section on 
disadvantages).  
•	 Engaging	the	offshore	oil	and	gas	industry	would	
require cooperation of the industry as well as elected 
officials in Congress. 
•	 The	implementation	of	a	funding	mechanism	utilizing	
revenue from royalties, leases, or other sources would 
require legislative action.
•	 Political	will	may	be	difficult	to	muster,	as	oil	and	 
gas companies have significant lobbying power  
in Congress.
•	 The	establishment	of	an	offshore	oil	and	gas	industry-
derived funding stream would occur over a long 
timeframe.
•	 Some	in	the	conservation	community	are	concerned	
that the development of an offshore oil and gas-based 
revenue stream could create an incentive for increased 
drilling;	creating	a	cycle	where	increased	drilling	
provides increased funding for conservation defeats 
the purpose of the funding mechanism.
•	 There	is	a	history	of	sensitivities	regarding	revenue	
sharing with states. Producing states might see this as 
dipping into their revenue shares, unless it is set up to 
specifically direct funding to them.
•	 Areas	that	have	declined	to	host	oil	and	gas	production	
would benefit from a fee on an industry they refused  
to host.
•	 If	the	implementation	of	a	new	revenue	source	is	
contingent on expanded exploration and access, the 
environmental impacts would be negative.
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Offshore Renewable Energy Revenues
Viability
Financial Moderate
Legal Low
Political Low
Social Moderate
Environmental Neutral
Timeframe Long
Future offshore renewable energy projects, such as wind 
energy in the east and wave energy in the west, present an 
opportunity to look at revenue sources through structures 
similar to those applied to the oil and gas industry. Revenue 
generated could include transactions stemming from 
royalties, leases, permits, and transmission line right-of-
way fees.
Determination of Feasibility
Advantages Disadvantages
•	 Offshore	renewable	energy	is	an	emerging	industry.	
Because of its nascent status, greater potential exists 
to shape the structure of a funding mechanism early.
•	 The	industry	is	expected	to	grow	incrementally,	and	
thus the fund would grow in tandem.
•	 This	revenue	source	itself	would	not	create	any	
negative impacts on the natural environment, as it 
would consist of charges to an activity that would 
occur regardless of whether a fee is implemented  
or not.
•	 Permitting	requirements	for	offshore	renewable	energy	
may limit rapid development.
•	 A	fee	may	seem	a	disincentive	to	offshore	renewable	
energy development. Currently, with a federal tax 
incentive to encourage wind development, it may be 
unwise to tax the industry now.
•	 Legislative	action	is	necessary	to	implement	an	
offshore renewable energy-based revenue stream. 
•	 A	fee	on	renewable	energy	may	shrink	profit	margins	
to the point where development is no longer viable. 
© phault/Flickr
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Increased Tax on Crude Oil
Viability
Financial Moderate
Legal Moderate
Political Low
Social Moderate
Environmental Neutral
Timeframe Medium
Directing funds from a tax on crude oil, such as the Oil Spill 
Liability Tax, could present an avenue for funding for 
marine conservation. The Oil Spill Liability Tax is levied on 
each barrel of crude oil produced or imported into the 
United States. The tax is currently $0.08 per barrel and is 
slated to go up to $0.09 in 2017 (FPMA, 2010). Monies 
collected from this tax are put into the Oil Spill Liability 
Trust Fund (OSLTF).
Determination of Feasibility
Advantages Disadvantages
•	 Revenue	generation	derived	from	tax	on	crude	oil	is	
known, and can be calculated based on the number of 
barrels produced or imported into the United States, 
making it a predictable revenue source.
•	 The	structure	of	the	fund	is	already	in	place	in	the	form	
of the OSLTF.
•	 This	revenue	stream	would	consist	of	an	increase	of	an	
existing tax, which is potentially more palatable than 
the creation of an entirely new tax.
•	 Increases	to	the	Oil	Spill	Liability	Tax	have	occurred	
periodically in the past, so there is an already 
established protocol on how the increases  
are implemented.
•	 A	per	barrel	tax	(which	falls	on	both	domestic	
production and imports) is favorable over rents and 
royalties imposed on United States rigs in the few 
coastal states that host them.
•	 This	revenue	source	would	not	affect	current	practices	
and thus would not have added environmental impacts. 
It would increase a fee on preexisting practices.
•	 Like	all	other	oil-	and	gas-based	options,	it	is	
anticipated that resistance by the industry to the idea 
would be substantial.
•	 Social	barriers	may	exist	due	to	the	possible	perception	
that the new fee would siphon funds from potential 
future oil spill cleanup.
The OSLTF was created in response to the Exxon Valdez 
spill. It has two major components:
(1) The Emergency Fund is available to federal on-scene 
coordinators to respond to discharges and for federal 
trustees to initiate natural resource damage 
assessments. The Emergency Fund is a recurring $50 
million available annually. 
(2) The Principal Fund balance is used to pay claims and 
to fund appropriations by Congress to federal 
agencies to administer the provisions of the Oil 
Pollution Act (OPA) and support research and 
development (U.S. Coast Guard, 2010).
At the current rate of crude oil production and import, 
every penny increase in the Oil Spill Liability Tax would 
generate an additional $69 million annually. The preemptive 
investment in ocean and coastal ecosystems could 
potentially reduce liability and costs associated with oil spill 
impacts and cleanup. Therefore, there is a strong argument 
for increasing the Oil Spill Liability Tax in order to have a 
dedicated portion directed to marine habitat enhancement 
and conservation.
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Increasing the Federal Excise Tax at  
the Pump
Viability
Financial High
Legal Moderate
Political Low
Social Low
Environmental Neutral
Timeframe Long
In the United States, federal gasoline tax receipts are 
frequently dedicated to transportation projects. However, 
with a percentage of that gasoline derived from offshore 
sources, it might be logical to direct part of this federal 
excise tax to marine conservation efforts. With an increase 
in the existing federal excise tax on gasoline, a percentage 
of the added revenue could be dedicated to marine 
conservation. The tax is currently 18.4 cents per gallon and 
the United States consumes 139 billion gallons of gasoline 
per year (USDOT, 2011b). With a 1/10 of a penny ($0.001) 
increase in the federal excise tax, the resulting revenue 
would be $140 million per year. With a ½ of a penny ($0.005) 
increase, the revenue would jump to $699 million annually.
Determination of Feasibility
Advantages Disadvantages
•	 Produces	a	very	large	and	dependable	funding	stream.
•	 The	taxation	system	is	already	in	place;	if	adopted	the	
timeframe for this to begin generating revenue is 
relatively short.
•	 May	present	a	secondary	environmental	benefit,	as	
gasoline usage usually decreases as the cost increases. 
•	 The	higher	cost	of	gasoline	may	also	create	an	
incentive for funding of innovative energy alternatives.
•	 An	excise	tax	that	has	a	fixed	amount	(e.g.,	$0.001	per	
gallon, as this one suggests) does not keep up with 
inflation or the changing value of the commodity.
•	 Significant	and	lengthy	legislative	work	is	required	to	
direct a portion to marine conservation.
•	 Difficult	to	identify	Congressional	supporters	of	a	gas	
tax increase.
•	 Unlikely	to	receive	public	support	for	increased	 
fuel prices.
•	 Lacks	direct	nexus	between	gasoline	and	United	States	
marine ecosystems.
•	 Over	the	last	few	years,	gas	tax	receipts	have	not	been	
enough to cover the transportation program, and the 
highway trust fund has been shrinking to the point 
where it’s near non-liquid or defunct. This may appear 
as competition for limited funds.
© Mark Dolyak
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Tax on Shipping Bunker Fuel
Viability
Financial High
Legal Low
Political Moderate
Social Moderate
Environmental Neutral
Timeframe Medium
The term “bunker fuel” refers to fuel that is used to propel 
ships. Bunker fuel is made from the very end products of 
the oil refining process, formulated from residues 
remaining from the primary distilling stages of the refining 
process. The residues are processed to produce a high-
viscosity fuel used by large cruise ships, container ships, 
and tankers. Bunker fuel sulfur dioxide (SOx) and nitrogen 
Determination of Feasibility
Advantages Disadvantages
•	 A	minimal	fee	produces	a	very	large	funding	stream.
•	 The	higher	cost	of	bunker	fuel	may	create	an	incentive	
for funding of innovative energy alternatives.
•	 Likely	to	receive	support	from	the	public,	especially	
due to the “dirtiness” of the fuel, its emissions, and its 
impacts to the environment.
•	 Direct	nexus	between	bunker	fuel	and	ocean	users.
•	 An	excise	tax	that	has	a	fixed	amount	(e.g.,	$0.50	to	
$1.00 per ton, as this one suggests) does not keep up 
with inflation or the changing value of the commodity.
•	 Significant	legislative	work	is	required	to	establish	this	
revenue source.
•	 Fuel	accounts	for	50	to	60	percent	of	the	total	cost	of	
operating a vessel, therefore it is unlikely that the 
shipping industry would support an increase. 
oxide (NOx) emission concentrations are considerably 
higher than those of the more refined and lighter gasoline 
and diesel fuels (Smith et al., 2011). This grade of fuel is 
primarily used because large vessel engines are designed 
to handle bunker fuel and it is far cheaper due to limited 
demand (nearly nonexistent outside of the maritime 
industry).
Large modern container vessels can consume over two 
hundred tons of bunker fuel per day, though fuel efficiency 
varies by vessel size and other factors. In 2009, nearly 
seven thousand oceangoing vessels (primarily tankers and 
containerships) made over fifty-five thousand calls at 
United States ports (USDOT, 2011b). Therefore hundreds of 
millions of tons of bunker fuel are likely consumed by 
vessels landing at United States ports every year. 
Even with a very minimal tax ($0.50 or $1.00 per ton), 
significant revenue could be generated. The tax could also 
include the amount of bunker fuel on a ship that was 
purchased at a foreign port before a United States landing.
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Oil Rig Removal Liability Fund
Viability
Financial Variable
Legal Moderate
Political Moderate
Social Moderate
Environmental Positive
Timeframe Medium
The Artificial Reef Program (ARP) receives 50 percent of an oil company’s savings from converting the installation to a 
reef, rather than bringing the structure to shore for salvage. Federal regulations require decommissioned installations to be 
removed for salvage if they do not participate in the ARP. The funds received are used to finance research, administration, 
maintenance, liability costs, and construction of new artificial reefs. The funds also make the Texas Artificial Reef Program 
self-sufficient, with no need for taxpayer dollars (Texas Parks and Wildlife, 2011).
Case Study – Oil Rig Removal Liability Fund: Artificial Reef Program in Texas
Determination of Feasibility
Advantages Disadvantages
•	 On	the	surface,	the	liability	fund	appears	to	benefit	 
the offshore oil and gas industry as well as  
conservation efforts.
•	 Multiple	environmental	benefits	would	ensue,	including	
marine habitat creation and conservation.
•	 The	financial	potential	of	a	revenue	source	based	on	oil	
rig removal liability is unpredictable.
•	 If	coordinated	with	the	Rigs-to-Reefs	program,	there	is	
concern that the new program could divert money from 
the state artificial reef programs.
•	 The	decommissioning	of	oil	rigs	does	not	occur	on	a	
regular basis, so a gap occurs in the funding stream 
when there is a lull in this activity.
•	 The	legislative	requirements	for	such	a	program	are	
murky. It is possible that a liability fund could be created 
as an amendment to the Rigs-to-Reefs federal policy.
•	 There	is	a	strong	risk	that	the	liability	would	outweigh	
the dollar benefits.
Decommissioning oil and gas installations is expensive. 
Although costs vary widely, removing a complete platform 
in shallow waters such as the Gulf of Mexico can cost $15 
to $20 million (Decomworld, 2009). Sometimes the removal 
of	an	entire	installation	is	unattractive;	in	part	because	at	
the point of decommissioning the installation has become 
encrusted with living organisms and can provide habitat to 
fish, and the removal at the point of anchoring can destroy 
benthic habitat.  This connection between fish habitat and 
oil and gas structures in the marine environment has 
garnered much interest and concern among fishermen, 
scuba divers, and coastal communities. However, 
significant liability issues exist with keeping rigs fully or 
partially in place, as they create hazards and risks to 
navigation and other ocean users. Meanwhile, if oil 
companies can either leave the installations in place or 
conduct only a partial removal, the cost savings could pay 
into a “liability fund” that would transfer the liability to the 
state. A portion of those funds could go into a mitigation 
fund, with the earnings from interest on the fund directed 
to conservation, restoration, and planning. 
The premise of this idea builds upon the existing Rigs-to-
Reefs program. This program is based on a federal policy 
used to convert outdated, nonproductive offshore oil and 
gas structures to designated artificial reefs. Under Title II of 
the National Fishing Enhancement Act of 1984 (P.L. 
98-623), the National Marine Fisheries Service developed 
and published a National Artificial Reef Plan (BOEMRE, 
2010b). This law set the stage for federal support of 
offshore artificial reef projects. With the policy in place, 
coastal states with approved, state-specific, artificial reef 
plans can identify offshore areas suitable for artificial reef 
developments. Therefore, oil and gas operators can work 
with state governments to transform decommissioned 
structures into artificial reefs as an alternative to  
onshore disposal.
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Fines
Viability
Financial Variable
Legal Moderate
Political Low
Social High
Environmental Neutral
Timeframe Short
Some regulations, such as the Natural Resource Damage 
Assessment (NRDA) under the Oil Pollution Act, have a 
legal mandate to direct recovery dollars to the region 
affected. The NRDA process involves an extensive injury 
assessment followed by a restoration plan to aid in the 
recovery of resources and compensate for the losses from 
the impacts. Recommendations on how the NRDA process 
can more effectively produce conservation outcomes  
Determination of Feasibility
Advantages Disadvantages
•	 Pay	out	for	violation	fines	can	be	quite	large.	For	the	
Deepwater Horizon Gulf Oil Spill Clean Water Act 
violations, the fine estimates range from $5 to $20 
billion depending on negligence findings. A one-time 
revenue infusion of this magnitude into a fund would 
be a healthy seed to generate grants and loans for 
marine conservation for years to come.
•	 These	regulatory	statutes	are	already	well	established	
within the United States policy framework.
•	 There	is	general	social	acceptance	of	such	a	revenue	
source, and most of the population would agree that 
violators should pay for environmental damages.
•	 The	potential	pay-out	for	the	Deepwater	Horizon	Gulf	
Oil Spill is only so large due to the catastrophic scale of 
the oil spill. 
•	 In	the	case	of	Clean	Water	Act	violations,	the	revenue	
stream would be very sporadic. 
•	 New	legislation	would	need	to	be	introduced	to	
continue to direct Clean Water Act fines to a 
conservation-dedicated fund.
•	 Political	will	could	greatly	depend	on	the	particular	
category of fine monies that are sought, as illegal 
fishing fines are very controversial and unpopular  
with fishermen.
•	 There	is	concern	that	establishing	such	a	source	would	
simply increase demand for enforcement services, and 
thus the cost of enforcement would be drawn from 
fines. Although enforcement is paid out of appropriated 
budgets in some cases, in other programs, 
enforcement and other costs come from fees paid  
by producers.
are discussed in a later section on Targeted  
Government Efficiencies.
The Clean Water Act allows the United States to seek civil 
fines for every drop of oil that is spilled into the nation’s 
navigable waters. However, there is no regulatory mandate 
to direct the fines to the region impacted. Legislation has 
been introduced to direct 80 percent of Clean Water Act 
penalties from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill to Gulf of 
Mexico restoration. These fines, estimated between $5 and 
$20 billion, may otherwise go to the Federal Treasury for 
purposes unrelated to the oil spill (The Nature 
Conservancy, 2011).
Another form of fine for illegal activities consists of illegal 
fishing penalties for the violation of various federal marine 
statutes, such as the Magnuson-Stevens Act, the 
Endangered Species Act, the National Marine Sanctuaries 
Act, and others. Currently, these fines are directed to the 
NOAA Office of Law Enforcement. A portion of these  
fines could be allocated to improving fish stocks or 
planning efforts.
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Mitigation
Viability
Financial Variable
Legal Moderate
Political Moderate
Social High
Environmental Neutral
Timeframe Long
Compensatory mitigation is the third step in a sequence of 
actions that must be followed to offset impacts under the 
Clean Water Act Section 404 regulations. First, one must 
attempt to avoid, then minimize, and finally compensate. 
For unavoidable impacts (discharges to wetlands, streams, 
and other aquatic resources), compensatory mitigation  
is required to replace the loss to resource functions  
in watersheds.
Determination of Feasibility
Advantages Disadvantages
•	 There	is	already	a	good	model	in	wetland	mitigation	
that can be emulated. 
•	 There	would	likely	be	a	general	acceptance	of	a	marine	
mitigation program.
•	 A	marine	resource	mitigation	plan	would	have	no	
anticipated environmental impacts, as the program 
would likely follow the “no net loss” protocol of  
wetland mitigation.
•	 Marine	resources	may	not	generate	enough	revenue	to	
make such a program sustainable. Since mitigation 
payments are based on the offset of impacted 
resources, there may not be enough impacts to create 
a fund, or the valuation of the offsets could be too low 
to generate significant revenue.
•	 The	establishment	of	a	marine	mitigation	fund	would	
require regulations that necessitate offsets.
•	 Marine	mitigation	would	likely	be	a	longer-term	effort.	
The valuation of offsets, the implementation of 
regulations, and the establishment of a fund would all 
require time to create.
There are three forms of compensatory mitigation, two of 
which have the potential to generate a funding stream: 
mitigation banking and in-lieu fee mitigation.
A mitigation bank is a business venture in which a large 
wetland is created, restored, or enhanced to generate 
wetland credits for sale to developers or others who need 
to offset unavoidable impacts. 
An in-lieu fee (ILF) program may also sell mitigation credits 
for impacts. This is generally accomplished through fees 
paid to a sponsor, such as a nonprofit organization or a 
public agency, which are then used to develop an on-the-
ground project within a certain time period.
Currently, the compensatory mitigation program applies 
only to tidal and non-tidal wetlands, as well as stream 
systems. With the appropriate regulatory environment, 
compensatory mitigation could extend to seagrasses, coral 
and oyster reefs, and other marine or coastal environments. 
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Payment for Ecosystem Services
Viability
Financial Variable
Legal Moderate
Political High
Social Moderate
Environmental Positive
Timeframe Long
Payment for ecosystem services (PES) assigns an economic 
value on services that natural resources provide, where 
payments are made for each measurable unit of natural 
resource performance. The concept of ecosystem services 
is attracting attention as a way to convey societal demands 
on ecological support systems. During the last three 
decades, there has been increasing research on the 
monetary value of ecosystem services, and interest has 
grown in the conceptual design of market-based 
instruments to create economic incentives for conservation 
(Westman,	1977;	Costanza	and	Daly,	1992;	Fisher	et	al.,	
2009). The concept has, however, had limited application. 
Emerging pilot projects and recent fully-operational 
programs, both domestic and international, utilize these 
concepts to develop markets to support conservation.
Ecosystem services in marine ecosystems can be derived 
from a number of sources including food from commercial 
fishing	and	aquaculture;	tourism	and	recreation;	storm	
protection through mangroves, wetlands, and coral and 
shellfish	reefs;	filtration	of	pollutants	and	nutrient	cycling;	
renewable	energy;	and	carbon	sequestration	(Forest	Trends	
and the Katoomba Group, 2010).
The arrangement behind a PES is one where those who 
provide environmental services (e.g., landowners) get paid 
for doing so. Those who benefit from environmental 
services (e.g., population within a watershed) pay for their 
provision.
Following is a case study that describes a successful  
PES scheme:
The Mexico countrywide PES program directs water use 
fees into conservation of forest cover in priority areas for 
enhancement of hydrological resources. The goal of the 
program is to curb deforestation while at the same time 
protecting the aquifer recharge function of natural 
forestlands. Water scarcity is a serious problem in 
Mexico, as two-thirds of its aquifers are exploited 
beyond their capacity. The program provides incentives 
for forest conservation with a share of revenues from 
existing water fees. 
The program funds originate from a dedicated share of 
the water use fees charged by the municipalities that 
are then channeled to the National Water Commission. 
This share is set at a fixed amount; it started at 200 
million Mexican pesos (about US$ 20 million) in 2003 
and was increased to 300 million Mexican pesos (about 
US$ 30 million) in 2005 (Water Markets, 2007). 
Case Study – Payment for Ecosystem 
Services: Mexico Countrywide PES Program
The Mexico case study also provides an interesting model 
of how to scale up a PES scheme to the federal level.
Multiple model types and scales can be applied to  
PES, including:
1. Direct government payments: Through various 
incentives, including tax credits, easements, or other 
methods of compensating landowners for providing 
ecosystems services.
2. Private sector payments: Private businesses, nonprofit 
organizations, and other private groups may provide 
payments to landowners for the services that their 
natural resources or land use changes provide.
3. Regulatory-based payments: Regulated entities may 
use PES as a control measure to meet federally-
mandated regulatory compliance. For example, to 
comply with sedimentation maximum loads, a 
regulated agency could purchase land in riparian 
areas to decrease development and assist in reducing 
sediment loads to meet permit requirements for 
sediments (World Bank, 2010). 
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A PES market is typically associated with a public policy or 
regulatory framework. However, the potential significant 
cost savings over engineered solutions may help drive the 
development of these service systems.
Difficulty with this model arises from the costs and time 
needed to quantify and verify the ecosystem services, the 
potential uncertainty about the quality of the services, and 
the need to involve multiple landowners for the system to 
be successful (requires significant buy-in). 
Research and demonstration pilot projects throughout the 
United States are needed to improve the credibility of the 
PES model, to learn the best management practices for 
these systems and to demonstrate the potential cost-
saving/revenue-generating potential of this model, in 
particular in ocean and coastal ecosystems. 
Socially and politically, it is possible to frame the concept 
as mutually beneficial, although it is understandable that 
the general public may feel some apprehension and  
will not want to pay for services they currently benefit  
from freely.
PES systems can be set up in multiple fashions, from small, 
locally based markets, to large-scale federal mechanisms. 
The most suitable revenue-generating scheme will greatly 
depend on the scale of the project. Following are a few 
possible options:
1. Similar to the example in Mexico, a portion of 
municipal water utility fees is directed to a national 
fund, which then sets up PES systems throughout the 
nation in the watersheds or coastal areas in greatest 
need of water quality improvements.
2. Setting up a structure like stormwater fees within 
designated assessment districts. These assessment 
districts determine the geographic areas benefitting 
from the ecosystem services provided by a natural 
resource (Scarlett, 2011). For example, residents of a 
coastal assessment district that is protected from 
storm surges by an oyster reef would pay into the fund 
that allows for that reef to be protected and enhanced.
Determination of Feasibility
Advantages Disadvantages
•	 Multiple	ecological	benefits	can	be	obtained	from	
natural resources. For example, oyster reefs provide not 
only shoreline protection services, but also fish habitat 
and nutrient filtration services.
•	 There	is	a	clear	nexus	between	the	preservation	and/or	
enhancement of the natural resource and the 
beneficiaries of the ecosystem service.
•	 A	PES	program	can	be	established	for	resources	
specific to the locality, i.e., oyster reefs for shoreline 
protection in the Southeast, or seagrasses for juvenile 
blue crab stock improvements in the Chesapeake Bay.
•	 Socially	and	politically,	it	is	possible	to	frame	the	
concept as mutually beneficial.
•	 The	true	financial	potential	of	a	funding	mechanism	
based on PES is yet to be discovered.  Although 
examples of significant cost savings are emerging, to 
date, there are few on-the-ground examples of marine 
resource PES revenue streams.
•	 Participation	in	a	PES	program	could	be	limited	if	the	
payments to landowners are not high enough for them 
to forego other uses of the land/resource.  Low levels 
of participation could result in programs with little or 
no control over the environmental improvements 
achieved.
•	 People	won’t	want	to	pay	for	services	they	currently	
benefit from freely.
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Nutrient Trading
Viability
Financial Variable
Legal Moderate
Political Moderate
Social Moderate
Environmental Positive
Timeframe Variable
Nutrient trading is an environmental market that involves a 
voluntary exchange between a buyer and a seller. What is 
being exchanged is a unit of environmental improvement. 
This market is driven by regulatory compliance of a set 
volume of nutrients allowable within water quality 
regulations for a given water body.  
The nutrient trading market is based on the premise that 
reducing nutrient inputs differs in costs between pollution 
Determination of Feasibility
Advantages Disadvantages
•	 No	negative	environmental	impacts	are	to	be	expected	
with	the	implementation	of	a	nutrient	trading	program;	
nutrient reduction would occur in a properly 
functioning market.
•	 Nutrient	trading	could	very	well	be	combined	with	
other credit trading mechanisms, such as wetland 
mitigation credits, endangered species offsets, etc.
•	 The	financial	revenue	potential	generated	by	a	nutrient	
trading funding mechanism would greatly depend on 
the size and the geography in which the market would 
be	introduced,	as	well	as	the	valuation	of	the	credits;	
though significant returns could ensue.
•	 The	timeframe	for	establishing	such	a	program	is	
difficult to predict.  
•	 The	implementation	of	a	nutrient	trading	program	
would require regulatory intervention with a cap on 
nutrient inputs to drive the market.
•	 The	need	for	funding	can	be	substantial	to	set	up	a	
trading program.
•	 The	hydrologic	divisions	in	a	watershed	nutrient	trading	
system make it challenging.
•	 Nonpoint	source	Best	Management	Practices	remove	
nitrogen more slowly than point sources can add it.  
Because of this lag time, nonpoint source credits 
should not be used before the timeframe in which they 
are generated.
sources. Trading allows polluters with higher reduction 
costs to purchase pollution reduction credits from another 
source at a lower cost in order to meet regulatory 
requirements. Nutrient trading is typically from a point 
source to a nonpoint source, where the nonpoint source 
has a nutrient input reduction below the permitted levels. 
Dischargers can exchange these allowances amongst 
themselves, e.g., point source financing reductions in 
nonpoint source in lieu of undertaking more expensive 
point source pollution reductions.
Innovations in nutrient trading consist of the recent 
exploration into “nutrient assimilators” as a potential source 
for offset credits to point and nonpoint source polluters. 
One watershed where regulators are investigating the 
concept of nutrient assimilators into their nutrient trading 
program is the Chesapeake Bay region. In the Chesapeake 
Bay, nutrient assimilators include managed wetlands, 
shellfish reefs, and submerged aquatic vegetation such as 
algae and aquatic plants. Pilot studies and research have 
begun to incorporate nutrient assimilators into the public 
marketplace for the buying and selling of nutrient (nitrogen 
and phosphorous) credits.  
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Blue Carbon
Viability
Financial Variable
Legal Moderate
Political Low
Social Moderate
Environmental Positive
Timeframe Long
Determination of Feasibility
Advantages Disadvantages
•	 Without	a	mandated	cap	on	carbon,	there	are	still	
opportunities to develop voluntary markets.
•	 Mangroves	could	be	added	to	the	forest	carbon	
portfolio. Though, how the funds derived from 
mangrove conservation would be financially separated 
from other forest types is unclear.
•	 Without	a	federal	regulatory	framework,	a	true	revenue	
generating market would only be established with the 
onset of a cap on carbon.
•	 Marine-based	carbon	sequestration	may	be	many	
years away from implementation. Building a blue 
carbon framework would require technical build-up, 
public acceptance, government buy-in, and defined, 
measurable results.
•	 It	took	decades	to	develop	the	carbon	program	in	the	
forest sector. The general consensus is that the 
agricultural sector is the next in line for development. 
Blue carbon is still highly speculative at this point  
in time.
•	 There	is	still	social	and	political	reluctance	in	the	
United States to accept the science of climate change. 
The aim of “blue carbon” is to do for mangroves, 
seagrasses and salt marshes what carbon credits have 
done for trees. Carbon credits are tradable certificates or 
permits representing a given unit of carbon dioxide. The 
blue carbon concept seeks to protect marine and coastal 
habitats by assigning credits to their stored carbon.
Carbon credits can be bought and sold on a carbon 
market. Both regulatory and voluntary carbon markets have 
gained popularity in recent years. The United States 
currently lacks the federal regulatory framework for 
emission reductions, hence not pressuring the emergence 
of the market. 
© Robert S. Donovan/Flickr
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National Partnership Agreements
Viability
Financial Variable
Legal High
Political High
Social High
Environmental Variable
Timeframe Short
 
The public and private sectors can collaborate in creating a 
framework for marine conservation. Such a public-private 
partnership implies a common understanding of shared 
conservation goals.
A public-private partnership is a contractual agreement 
between a public agency (federal, state, or local) and a 
private sector entity. Through this agreement, the skills and 
assets of each sector are shared in delivering a service for 
the use of the general public. In addition to the sharing of 
resources, each party shares in the risks and rewards 
potential in the delivery of the service (NCPPP, 2011).
There are critical components of any successful public-
private partnership. They include the appropriate statutory 
and political environment, a guaranteed revenue stream, 
stakeholder support, and the appropriate matching of 
partners to accomplish the task (NCPPP, 2011). 
Partnerships provide opportunities to team with non-
traditional groups and organizations, for example, 
foundations that haven’t historically worked on marine and 
conservation	issues;	corporations	that	have	a	stake	in	
conservation;	and	groups	that	have	traditionally	not	been	
viewed as conservation allies, but could play an important 
role in conservation and restoration such as aquaculture.
The NOAA Community-based Restoration Program 
began in 1996 with the goal of sustaining local efforts to 
conduct coastal habitat restoration. Since its inception, 
the program has funded more than 1,500 projects. 
Cumulatively, these projects have restored more than 
41,000 acres of habitat and have ameliorated fish 
passage in more than 1,700 stream miles, while 
simultaneously encouraging community-based 
participation in coastal conservation. The program 
successfully invests millions of dollars annually in 
restoration grants, leveraging double and triple the 
outcome by working with partner organizations. The 
enacted budget for the Community-based Restoration 
Program in Fiscal Year 2010 was $18.6 million (NOAA, 
2011a).  
Since 2001, the Conservancy and NOAA’s Community-
based Restoration Program have been working in a 
formal National Partnership to create healthy coastal 
habitats and increase economic and social well-being in 
coastal communities. Over this first decade, the 
partnership has been engaged in 124 community-based 
projects and some $8 million in federal funds have been 
matched by more than $10 million in additional state, 
local, and private funds to implement innovative 
restoration projects yielding tangible results that improve 
the condition of coastal waterways around the United 
States. These projects include (1) ecosystem restoration 
activities such as staghorn coral restoration in the 
Florida Keys, oyster and seagrass restoration in Virginia’s 
Coast Reserve, and watershed restoration within 
California’s Garcia River Watershed; (2) community 
engagement activities through Hawaii’s invasive species 
removal program and Gulf of Mexico oyster reef 
restoration; and (3) socio-political leveraging as seen 
with the New York Great South Bay hard clam 
restoration and NOAA’s recognition of shellfish as a 
priority habitat; to name a few.
Case Study – NOAA’s Community-based 
Restoration Program
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Determination of Feasibility
Advantages Disadvantages
•	 The	financial	pay	off	for	public-private	partnerships	will	
greatly depend on the entities entering the 
partnerships;	however,	seed	funds	can	often	be	
leveraged to many times the original amount.
•	 Partnerships	would	not	require	federal	legislative	
intervention;	however,	they	would	require	some	form	of	
agreement between parties.
•	 Partnerships	are	still	a	largely	untapped	market.	It	is	
thought that encouraging further public-private 
partnerships could lead to major innovation.
•	 Partnerships	could	feasibly	become	adopted	in	a	very	
short timeframe.
•	 Public-private	partnerships	would	most	likely	attract	
popular support, especially in arrangements that have 
significant community engagement.
•	 Without	knowing	the	nature	of	the	public-private	
partnership agreement, it is impossible to determine 
whether environmental impacts would result.
© Mark Dolyak 
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Targeted Government Efficiencies
Viability
Financial Variable
Legal High
Political High
Social High
Environmental Positive
Timeframe Short
Targeted government efficiencies are viewed as a feasible 
option for cost reduction and maximizing existing federal 
dollars. This option may allow for changes and 
consolidations within agencies that would not require 
Congressional	approval;	hence,	it	is	potentially	faster	and	
less cumbersome to implement than other funding options. 
The following are a few opportunities that may exist to 
develop more efficient uses of federal dollars and  
produce greater conservation outcomes with the money 
already budgeted.
(i) Natural Resource Damage Assessment
Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA) is a legal 
process to determine the type and amount of restoration 
needed to compensate the public for harm to natural 
resources and their human uses that occur as a result of 
an oil spill. Restoration actions are principally designed to 
return injured resources to baseline conditions, but may 
also compensate the public for the interim loss of injured 
resources from the onset of injury until baseline conditions 
are reestablished. Historically, restoration activities have 
been completed at the site of injury or in close proximity to 
that site.
Restoring the habitat in the area of impact may assist in 
restoring the area to its baseline condition. However, that 
strategy may not result in the greatest conservation 
outcome for the resources impacted. In many instances, 
greater conservation outcomes would result from offsite 
restoration, sometimes in an entirely separate region or 
state. Provisions under existing NRDA regulations allow for 
offsite applications of settlement funds. However, 
stakeholders either might not understand those provisions 
or might not wish to apply funds offsite due to a desire to 
keep funds within the state or county impacted. Following 
is a case study where NRDA funds were applied out-of-
state to assist with the protection of common loon  
nesting habitat.
In January 1996, an oil barge ran aground off Trustom 
Pond National Wildlife Refuge in Rhode Island, spilling 
over 800 thousand gallons of heating oil. The incident 
resulted in the death of a multitude of fish, seabirds, 
crustaceans, mollusks, and other invertebrates. In 2000, 
NOAA, USFWS, and the State of Rhode Island reached 
a settlement agreement for the companies responsible 
for the oil spill. As part of that settlement, a portion of 
the restoration was to be conducted in the State of 
Maine, which provides nesting habitat for at least 125 
common loon pairs and more than 600 pairs of nesting 
common eider. As a result, 1.5 million acres of Maine 
forests and lakes that provide these habitats were 
permanently protected through conservation easements 
and fee acquisitions (USFWS, 2005).
Case Study – Targeted Government Efficiencies: 
NRDA Nesting Habitat for Common Loons
(ii) NOAA Grant Program Consolidation
The Fiscal Year 2012 Senate Commerce, Justice, Science, 
and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill report (the 
legislation that funds the activities and operations of 
NOAA) directs the agency to “consolidate funding for 
restoration and conservation grant programs throughout 
the agency, not only within NMFS, including the Estuary 
Restoration Program, the Damage Assessment, 
Remediation and Restoration Program, and the Coastal and 
Estuarine Land Protection Program…[with the purpose] to 
eliminate duplicative activities and administration, and 
establish a reasonable path forward for sound 
environmental restoration within the scope of the agency’s 
authorization and financial potential” (Senate of the United 
States, 2011b).
No overarching legislation governs NOAA’s stewardship 
programs;	they	are	a	collection	of	authorized	programs	
with the goal to support healthy oceans and the human 
communities that depend on them. The direction of 
Congress to reorganize or consolidate NOAA’s grant 
program is an effort to reduce operating costs through 
better coordination of programs with similar goals to 
maximize the funds available to achieve the goal. The 
following five principles are vital for a successful 
consolidated habitat conservation program at NOAA:
1. Any reorganization or consolidation must have, as its 
stated purpose, a furthering of NOAA’s mission and 
statutory responsibilities to conserve and restore 
coastal habitats important to threatened and 
endangered species, commercial and recreational 
fisheries, and the people and communities who rely 
upon them.
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2. Priority should be given to the core missions of 
existing programs, including but not limited to: stream 
barrier and dam removal, coastal land protection, 
estuarine habitat restoration, and floodplain 
restoration and protection.
3. The efficiency and cost effectiveness of NOAA’s 
cooperative agreements and strategic partnerships 
with coastal states and NGOs should be recognized.
4. A commitment should be made to maintaining 
adequate funding for habitat conservation in the face 
of any reorganization. Redesigning the implementation 
of these programs should not be an exercise solely 
driven by cost cutting.  
5. Any reorganization or realignment plan will be most 
successful when developed in consultation and with 
the full participation of the states, communities, and 
organizations whose missions align with, and whose 
actions help achieve NOAA’s mission. 
(iii) Increase Coastal and Estuarine Nonpoint 
Source Projects under the CWSRF
As allowed by the Clean Water Act, states have some 
flexibility in designing their Clean Water State Revolving 
Fund programs to meet their individual clean water needs. 
States may choose the extent to which they will use 
CWSRF funds to support point source (e.g., wastewater 
treatment plant construction) and nonpoint source (e.g., 
implementing agricultural best management practices) 
projects. 
CWSRF funding for nonpoint source pollution activities 
account for approximately four percent of monetary 
allocations;	however,	it	accounts	for	over	25	percent	of	all	
CWSRF-supported activities. Nonpoint source projects are 
typically less expensive than wastewater infrastructure 
projects;	therefore	less	money	can	fund	a	larger	
percentage of projects for greater water quality outcomes. 
As of 2006, thirty-seven states reported using CWSRF to 
directly support nonpoint source projects (GAO, 2006). 
Under existing CWSRF regulations, states can use funds 
for a number of coastal and estuarine-related projects, 
including the development of Comprehensive Coastal 
Management Plans under EPA’s National Estuary Program. 
In the state of Washington, for example, up to 20 percent of 
its CWSRF dollars are used to support nonpoint source 
projects and estuary conservation and management 
projects. Meanwhile, in Alabama, state law defines only 
traditional public wastewater treatment facilities as 
appropriate projects under its CWSRF program (GAO, 
2006). 
A shift to a greater acceptance and use of CWSRF funds 
for nonpoint source projects, and in particular coastal and 
estuarine projects in coastal states, should occur. Existing 
federal regulations allow for those activities, and there is a 
need for education to demonstrate that the same water 
quality outcomes can be achieved through “green 
infrastructure” and other methodologies with potentially 
great cost savings.
In addition to a shift from hard infrastructure, the CWSRF 
program could also be an ideal launching pad for the 
expansion of water quality-based PES or water quality 
trading systems throughout the United States. Water 
companies and utilities across the globe are beginning to 
demonstrate projects with the promise of cost savings over 
traditional hard infrastructure projects and upgrades. 
The case study on the next page provides a great example 
of how such a payment or trading program could generate 
water quality improvements to meet the goals of the Clean 
Water Act which are addressed by the CWSRF. The cost 
savings achieved from this project provides an example of 
how a PES/water quality trading mechanism might be well 
suited under the CWSRF.
Funding from California’s CWSRF helped The Nature 
Conservancy of California purchase a 12,362-acre 
portion of the Howard Ranch in southeast Sacramento 
County, one of the largest land acquisitions funded in 
the United States under the CWSRF. The California 
State Water Resources Control Board and the EPA 
supplied an $8 million low-interest loan for the 
Conservancy to complete the $13.6 million fundraising 
target (Ernst and Hart, 2005).
Case Study – Targeted Government Efficiencies: 
Innovative Use of CWSRF Funds for Land 
Acquisition
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Clean Water Services (CWS) is a special-purpose district utility in Washington County, Oregon, that provides wastewater 
and stormwater management services to over five hundred thousand residents. CWS operates two wastewater treatment 
plants that discharge to the Tualatin River – a water body impaired for temperature, nutrients and other indicators. In 2001, 
the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) issued a Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) for temperature in 
the Tualatin River and its tributaries (DEQ, 2001). The TMDL showed that approximately 40 percent of the thermal energy 
input into the Tualatin River comes from the sun’s energy reaching the river from altered urban and rural land use (CWS, 
2005). These impacts from loss of shade created the opportunity to develop a trading program by restoring streams as 
opposed to technological solutions at the treatment plants. The Tualatin trading program augments tree canopies, 
manages invasive species, and engages in other activities to increase the amount of shade along streams. The permit 
obtained by CWS allows it to address its treated effluent discharge temperature requirements by trading point-to-nonpoint 
thermal load reduction credits within the watershed. By trading thermal load reduction credits, CWS and its ratepayers 
were able to avoid $60 to $150 million for construction and maintenance of refrigeration units at its wastewater treatment 
facilities (Cochran and Logue, 2011), while the trading option has cost just $4.3 million, a 95% cost savings compared with 
traditional approaches (Roll et al., 2008).
Case Study - Water Quality Trading in the Tualatin River Watershed, Oregon
Determination of Feasibility
Advantages Disadvantages
•	 Effective	use	of	existing	dollars	for	greater	 
conservation outcomes.
•	 Potentially	large	sums	of	money	could	be	directed	 
to conservation.
•	 Would	not	require	a	new	funding	mechanism.
•	 There	is	a	strong	willingness	from	the	Administration	
and Congress to streamline programs.
•	 Likely	to	be	popular	amongst	taxpayers.
•	 Positive	environmental	outcomes	are	to	be	expected	as	
existing funds would target greater conservation 
achievements.
•	 Reconfigured	programs	would	still	require	going	
through the annual appropriations process.
•	 Consolidating	programs	could	have	unwanted	
outcomes, including having to make difficult decisions 
regarding eliminating important or popular programs.
•	 Streamlining	does	not	always	equate	to	efficiencies	
and added dollars for the programs of environmental 
importance.
Appendix C: 
State and Local 
Revenue Sources
© New York District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers/Flickr
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Appendix C: State and Local Revenue Sources
The following state and local revenue sources were discovered during the initial research. Although not applicable to the 
scope of this project, these ideas may prove useful as tools for providing state or local matching funds for a federal-level 
funding mechanism.
Source Description
Bag Tax A tax for the use of disposable bags.
The District of Columbia imposes a five-cent tax on disposable retail bags (paper 
and plastic). The tax generated a total of $2 million in 2010.
Bioprospecting Research into new sources for pharmaceuticals and other products of potential 
economic value.
Bottle Tax A tax on the purchase of certain bottled beverages (typically excludes juice, milk, 
and two-liter sodas).  
For example, the City of Baltimore has adopted a two-cent tax on some bottled 
beverages. The tax is expected to generate $5.7 million for the City over  
three years.
Cigarette Tax Cigarette tax is an excise tax on the sale or possession of cigarettes.
Diving Fees A tourism-based source of revenue that is derived from diving fees for marine 
protected areas.
Fishery Best Management 
Practices and Certification
Voluntary private-sector programs, such as certification programs, can provide 
incentives for private entities (e.g., aquaculture) by providing recognition for 
ecologically	sound	practices;	such	as	improving	operation	water	quality	and	
implementing price premiums for customers willing to pay more for sustainable 
products. Through a certification program, consumer purchasing power is 
harnessed to generate change while also promoting marine protection  
and restoration. 
State and Municipal 
Government Bonds
Two types of government bonds are available: general obligation (GO) and 
revenue. GO bonds are backed by the issuer’s ability to tax. Money for revenue 
bonds is generated from the operation of the project being financed or from other 
non-tax sources.  Some bonds consist of hybrids of these two types. Government 
bonds are most frequently applied at the state and local levels of government.
Hotel/Transportation Fees Allocation of a portion of hotel and airport fees and taxes to support conservation 
efforts. Can include the establishment of an additional fee or tax specifically to 
raise funds for conservation.
Impact Fees Impact fees can link revenues to practices to be rectified or accounted for (e.g., 
development impacts). Revenue from Impact Fees can help recover the cost 
incurred by a local government in providing public facilities required to serve the 
new development.
Lottery Revenue On average, states receive 31.5 percent of the revenue from lottery ticket sales as 
final proceeds.  In some states the amount is much larger. Proceeds may be 
allocated to fund conservation efforts.  
Real Estate Transfer Tax A portion of the real estate transfer tax is directed to a fund dedicated to 
conservation programs.
Recreation Fees A tourism-based source of revenue that is derived from recreational activity fees 
for uses such as transportation and camping.
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Source Description
Right-of-Way Fees for 
Telecommunication Industry
Fees assessed for each mile of telecommunication cabling and other conveyance 
cables and pipes. 
For example, the California Coastal Commission requires applicants to 
compensate for project-related impacts to hard-bottom habitat with a fee of 
$27.31 per square foot to be used to construct a new artificial reef or augment an 
existing artificial reef in state waters.
Selective Sales Tax on 
“Polluting Items”
Selective sales taxes on items such as agricultural chemicals or fuels raise 
revenue and can shift behavior away from polluting products.
Tax could be designed in concert with federal, state, and private sector program 
to leverage additional monies.
Shipping Insurance  
Premium Tax
Insurance premiums tax is a tax paid by all stock insurance companies, mutual 
insurance companies, and captive insurers doing business in a given state. The 
tax is assessed on premiums collected by insurance companies on policies 
written in the state during the preceding calendar year.
The insurance premium surcharge is charged and collected by every insurer 
(other than life insurers) on premiums, assessments, or other charges, for 
insurance coverage provided to its policyholders on risks located in the  
given state.
Specialty License Plates Raise money and awareness for a cause through increased fees for specialty 
motor vehicle license plates.
State Income Tax Check-off With check-off programs, taxpayers “check off” a contribution to state programs 
on a state personal income tax form.
Statewide Sales Tax Increase Tax on the sales of goods or services. In Iowa, 2010 voters supported the Water 
and Land Legacy Amendment, a measure designed to fund future conservation 
efforts in the state. The measure will amend the Iowa constitution and set aside 
3/8 of 1 percent of the next increase to the state’s sales tax for conservation 
projects. The amendment creates the Natural Resources and Outdoor Recreation 
Trust Fund.
Transfer of Development 
Rights
The transfer of development rights (TDR) provides communities with a tool for 
redirecting growth from one area of a community to another. The TDR is a 
planning technique for controlling development density. Under such a program, a 
community or regulatory agency regulates site densities by allowing higher 
densities on some parcels in exchange for lower densities on other parcels. Use 
of a TDR requires establishing both “sending” and “receiving” areas.
User/Entry Fees A tourism-based source of revenue derived from entry fees for protected areas.
Utility Surcharges These are sewer or stormwater surcharges, funneled to a dedicated fund. A utility 
is an enterprise that performs a service and has the authority to charge fees for 
that service. For stormwater management, landowners are assessed a fee that is 
based on their parcel size and the degree to which their land is developed. 
Typically, residential parcels are grouped into a size class with a common fee 
within each class. Commercial parcels are assessed individually and charged a 
site-specific fee. Fees are most commonly collected via existing water bill systems 
or as a line item on property tax statements. These utilities could be established 
within a municipality, a county, or encompass a whole watershed.
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